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Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling
Government Interest in Protecting the Time of
Candidates and Elected Officials
Mark C. Alexander*
I. INTRODUCTION
As candidates spend more money during their campaigns, they
become more shackled to the machinery of fundraising. They spend
increasing amounts of time dialing for dollars, attending fundraisers,
and cultivating prospective donors. But these candidates, often already
in office themselves, are consequently spending less time speaking with
the people, studying legislation, and governing. In short, fundraising
takes time away from elected officials in the performance of their
duties.
This presents several particular problems. First, as candidates divert
time and attention to fundraising, they do not engage in the critical
conversation that is the essence of the campaign.' Next, and as a result
of the first problem, candidates who are also already officeholders
become nearly full-time fundraisers and neglect the people's business.
2
Due to the time taken for fundraising, the political process has so
broken down that the people's will cannot be effectively served.
Some jurisdictions have responded to these problems by enacting
reform measures that justify campaign fundraising and spending
limitations by identifying the need to protect elected officials' time.
This "time protection" rationale has received scant attention in
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. My thanks go to numerous colleagues
and friends, including but not limited to Amy Alexander, Vince Blasi, John Bonifaz, Devon
Corneal, Tristin Green, Eddie Hartnett, Thomas Healy, Peter Watson, and Brenda Wright. I am
indebted to my research assistants, Scott Reiser and Adam Wells, for their hard work. Finally, I
appreciate the financial support provided by the Seton Hall University Law School Research
Assistance Fund.
1. Instead of talking to voters, debating an opponent, or engaging with the media, candidates
turn heavily to fundraising, which skews the focus of the campaign.
2. Republican government suffers as a result, as representation is diminished and the people
are no longer well served.
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academia and the courts, but the issue is increasing in importance. 3
There is now a circuit split as to the specific question of whether the
time protection of elected officials is a compelling government interest
that can be used to justify campaign finance reform measures, and the
issue has been put to the U.S. Supreme Court for consideration. 4 This is
an idea whose time has come, and this article explains how time
protection can become a powerful force for campaign reform.
According to Buckley v. Valeo5 and its progeny, through and
including the recent decision in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,6 any restraint on campaign finance reform must survive
strict scrutiny, as it impacts core First Amendment activity. This Article
ultimately shows that protecting the time of candidates and
officeholders is a compelling government interest that can justify
campaign finance reform measures, most notably expenditure limits.
The Article will proceed in three main stages to establish that there is
a compelling government interest in protecting the time of elected
officials and that the interest supports limits on campaign spending.
Part II will detail the basic business of political campaigns for public
office and will7particularly emphasize the dimensions and implications
of fundraising. Further this Part will present a view of the system
based on recent research, including interviews of candidates and
officeholders speaking freely about their experiences. 8  This will
3. It was barely mentioned in the context of the landmark case Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), and its only significant academic treatment came in 1994, when Vincent Blasi raised it in
a symposium article. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1994). More than a decade has passed since then, but this idea has
not been developed further in the literature, although it is just now getting some attention in the
courts.
4. Compare Landell v. Sorrell (Landell H), 382 F.3d 91, 129 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted sub
nom. Vt. Republican State Comm. v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005) (holding that campaign
expenditure limits can be constitutional) with Homans v. City of Albuquerque (Homans 11), 366
F.3d 900, 916 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that campaign expenditure limits are not constitutional).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Homans 11, 366 F. 3d 900, 911 (10th. Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1002 (2004); Landell H is currently before the Court, docket numbers 04-1528,
04-1530, 04-1697, and the Justices heard oral argument on February 28, 2006.
5. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
6. 540 U.S. 93, 95 (2003).
7. See infra Part H (explaining that fundraising consumes time and thus reduces the time
available to politicians to perform the jobs they were elected to do).
8. The Center for Responsive Politics' compendium SPEAKING FREELY, published in several
editions, including 1995 and 2003, provides a source for interviews with current and former
members of the House and Senate, in which the members candidly and frankly address the role of
money in politics. See LARRY MAKINSON, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SPEAKING
FREELY: WASHINGTON INSIDERS TALK ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS (2d ed. 2003) (tracking the
flow of campaign dollars to federal candidates, parties, and political action committees); MARTIN
SCHRAM, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF
Let Them Do Their Jobs
provide a picture of how much money is spent, how candidates raise
that money, and what candidates are not doing when they are out raising
money. The picture presented shows candidates spending countless
hours raising money by courting a limited group of individuals, instead
of meeting voters, engaging opponents, debating or voting on
legislation, and the like.
Part III will explain the constitutional dimensions of the problem and
will reveal various compelling interests at every turn. First, as
candidates spend so much time chasing money from a limited group of
donors, campaigns-an essential component of American representative
democracy-are distorted. 10  As campaigns are part of democratic
dialogue, this distortion raises a compelling concern. Second, many
candidates are already officeholders-public servants paid with
taxpayer dollars to do the people's business-and the diversion of their
time threatens the specific constitutional commitment to protect the time
of Members of Congress in the exercise of core legislative functions,
found in the Speech or Debate Clause. l ' Third, the money chase
threatens the integrity of the American republic by skewing the entire
process of representative democracy. 12 The average citizen is ignored
at the expense of the few, on whom the candidate-officeholder is
lavishing attention. Considered together, these three factors create a
compelling government interest that can justify regulations on campaign
activities.
Finally, Part IV will consider the attendant question of what
follows. 3 While not advocating any specific plan or law, 14 this Part
CONGRESS TALK ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS (1995), available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/speaking/speakingindex.html (providing interviews with
members of the House and Senate discussing campaign politics).
9. See infra Part III (exploring the opportunity the Supreme Court has to weigh in on the issue
of campaign finance reform and the corresponding compelling governmental interest).
10. The average voter disappears from the radar screen of the candidate who is focused on the
few, wealthy individuals who are likely to donate large sums. These individuals represent an
economic elite who often live outside of the district that the candidates seek to represent.
11. The problem is that instead of doing the job they are paid to do for the people, they are
spending inordinate hours raising money for their own campaigns. This tension tears at the
ability of government to function fully. This is a common sense conflict of great import.
12. In a representative democracy power derives from the people whose will is done by
elected officials in government. Legislators draft bills, debate legislation, and cast votes.
Mayors, governors, and the president are entrusted with the execution of those laws. Instead of
doing the people's work, they are working on fundraising prospects. The distraction from duty is
a time conflict.
13. See infra Part IV (discussing alternatives in campaign finance reform).
14. This Article is not endorsing or proposing any one level of spending, or any precise
formula. Instead, it is a direct challenge to the proposition that Buckley provides a per se ban on
expenditure limits, and specifically suggests a compelling government interest-time
20061
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
will consider three major ways to remedy the problem that too much
time is spent raising money. The first is to make it easier to raise lar e
sums of campaign cash by removing limits on contributions.
Although this could make it easier to raise money, it exposes the
electoral system to corruption, the prevention of which has already been
identified as a compelling government interest. It forces us to protect
one value (time protection) at the expense of another (corruption
prevention). In addition, it would further skew the problem of a
reliance on the most wealthy who have the ear of candidates and
officeholders, to the detriment of the broader conversation that
ultimately should inform politics and government. Lifting contribution
limits thus is not well-tailored to meet the compelling government
interest in time protection.
The second alternative, public financing, addresses the problem by
relieving candidates from the need to spend time raising money. 16 The
idea is that it is better for candidates not to have to chase money at all-
let the government provide it, and the candidates can be free to stop
dialing for dollars. While appealing on its surface, this approach is
ultimately unsatisfactory because under the current legal regime, all
public-financing schemes must be voluntary, and, therefore, they easily
can be-and often are-ignored. Public financing thus fails to account
for candidate opt out, resulting from the all-too-common phenomenon
of an extremely wealthy individual or a singularly prodigious
fundraising machine. Without mandatory compliance (which in itself
would be a form of spending caps), this is an illusory option.
The third-and, as this Article concludes, best-response to the
problem is campaign expenditure limits. 17 These limits put the brakes
on runaway spending and therefore can stop the time drain that
jeopardizes the integrity of the electoral process. Limited campaign
spending lessens fundraising needs. Reduced fundraising frees
candidates and officeholders to spend more time in pursuit of
conversations with the people, reading and voting on legislation, and the
like-the wide open political debate that rests at the heart of American
protection-that would justify such limits. Under this new paradigm, federal, state, and local
governments could enact campaign spending limits in order to protect the time of candidates and
officeholders. Subsequent analyses should take this new analytical approach and ask whether the
limits put in place serve the compelling government interest in time protection.
15. See infra Part IV.A (addressing limits placed on contributions as a means of campaign
finance reform).
16. See infra Part 1V.B (discussing a public-financing alternative and its drawbacks).
17. See infra Part IV.C (characterizing the spending limits alternative as the most narrowly
tailored choice).
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representative democracy. Of the three main remedial options, this
Article ultimately argues that limiting campaign expenditures is the
most narrowly tailored means available to protect the time of candidates
and officeholders. 
18
II. THE CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING PROBLEM
As campaigns become more expensive, fundraising becomes an ever-
more time-consuming affair. Candidates and officeholders become, in
effect, full-time fundraisers. They do so at the expense of so much
else-opportunities to meet voters, to debate opponents, and to speak
with the media. Officeholders miss committee meetings, do not spend
ample time reviewing legislation, and constantly shoehorn the people's
business into the time not filled by private fundraising. This Part
examines the data on how much money is raised and spent in
campaigns, and it rounds out the campaign finance picture by heeding
the words of those who raise the money. The final image is one where
fundraising is a priority at the expense of representative democracy and
the functioning of the electoral process.
A. Increasing Campaign Costs
Campaign costs continually increase at a rate faster than inflation,
and no end is in sight. 19 Overall Congressional candidate fundraising
increased 425% between 1978 and 2000, compared to 170% inflation
during the same period. 20 The average victorious Senate campaign in
1986 cost just over $3 million, compared to nearly $7.4 million in
2000-a 154% increase, adjusted for inflation.2' Consider this
18. See infra Part V (concluding that campaign spending limits are the most effective and
constitutionally sound way to protect the time of government officeholders).
19. The amount of money spent on campaigns is not per se excessive. Several billion dollars
spent, for a wealthy country with a population approaching 300 million, is not such a large
amount, per capita. While there are many other problems that arise as a result of these large sums
being spent, the particular problem addressed in these pages is the amount of time that must be
spent raising that money.
20. U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, LOOK WHO'S NOT COMING TO WASHINGTON
9 (2005). From 1986 to 2000, the average cost of a successful campaign for the United States
House of Representatives rose from $359,577 to $848,296. Id. Adjusted for inflation, this
amounts to a 151 percent increase.
21. Id. The 1986 statistic is calculated by dividing the total spent by winning Senate
candidates in the 1986 election by the number of Senators elected that term: thirty-three. Press
Release, Federal Election Commission, Congressional Fundraising and Spending Up Again in
1996 (Apr. 14, 1997), http://www.fec.gov/press/press1997/canye96.htm. The average money
spent by a victorious Senate candidate in 2004 was $7.84 million. This figure was compiled from
information made available by CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 2004 ELECTION OVERVIEW:
WINNING VS. SPENDING, http://www.opensecrets.org (follow "2004 Election Overview"
hyperlink under "Election Overview"; then follow "Winning vs. Spending" under "Races") (last
20061
674 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 37
example: in 1992, the average Senator had to raise nearly $13,000 each
week during the entire six-year term in order to amass the amount that a
winning Senate race would cost.22  In 1999, Senator Barbara Boxer
estimated that for a successful Senate campaign in California, a
candidate would need to raise $10,000 each day of the entire six-year
term. 23 In fact, she raised money at almost twice that rate-raising an
average of nearly $19,000 per day in the 2003-04 election cycle.24 But
Senator Boxer was not the leading fundraiser in the Senate that most
recent cycle. South Dakota (one of the least populated states in the
nation 25 ) was home to the largest fundraising in the 2004 Senate
election cycle, as the two candidates raised a combined $37.4 million.26
Further, the 2004 presidential election shattered all previous fundraising
records and both major party nominees opted out of the public financing
system for their respective party's primary campaigns. 27  Combined,
they raised a total of $496.6 million in contributions from individuals.28
visited Feb. 16, 2006).
22. HERBERT ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL
REFORM 54 (1992).
23. 145 CONG. REC. S12575, S12608 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
One of her former House colleagues, Rep. Thomas Downey of New York, said: "[T]omorrow I'm
going to a breakfast for one of my colleagues who's now a senator, who was just elected. One of
my closest friends is Sen. [Barbara] Boxer from California. Now she has to have fund-raisers all
the time. All the time .... It is sick." SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 39-40 (quoting Rep.
Thomas Downey (D-NY)).
24. For her 2004 re-election, Sen. Boxer raised a total of $16.7 million. CENTER FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, OPENSECRETS: U.S. CONGRESS PROFILES,
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.asp (enter "Boxer" under "Search for a
Member") (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). Of that, in the 2003-04 cycle she raised $13.8 million. Id.
Divided evenly over two years and 365 days per year, this amount equals $18,904 per day, every
day, weekends and holidays included.
25. South Dakota ranks 46th in terms of population. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 2004-2005, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-
abstract-2001_2005.html (select "table 18").
26. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, CONGRESSIONAL RACES,
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/index.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
27. While there were many candidates on the Democratic side, there were no serious
Republican contenders for the party's primary election other than the president. Therefore,
President Bush raised these sums in the primary season even in the absence of a credible primary
opponent.
28. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEC CANDIDATE SUMMARY REPORT: GEORGE W.
BUSH, available at http:l/query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/candetaiU/P00003335/ (last visited Feb. 16,
2006); FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEC CANDIDATE SUMMARY REPORT: JOHN F. KERRY,
available at http://query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/can-detail/P80000235/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
Put another way, the two candidates combined raised at least one million dollars per day for well
over a year.
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B. The Campaign Money Chase
In campaigns, as candidates have been spending more money, they
have had to find ways to raise that money. However, individual
contributions have not kept pace, in part because of a federal regulatory
system in which contributions are capped but expenditures are not.
30
The percentage of Americans who contribute to campaigns has
remained relatively flat,31 and until just recently, contribution limits
stayed constant, effectively losing nearly three-quarters of their value
over the years.3 2 Needing more money, but facing limits on what any
one person can give, Members of Congress have described a money
chase that is more time consuming cycle after cycle,33 occupying them
all the time, wherever they go. This Section briefly describes the key
29. Candidates must find an increased supply of money in order to meet the increased demand
from campaigns. Individual fundraising generates that supply. This relatively straightforward
concept of income and expenditures is reflected in the words of Members of Congress. "'[T]he
fundraising demands grew geometrically in the 12 years that I was there. More and more time
was being spent raising money, because the amounts of money required each cycle were
greater."' MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 40 (quoting Sen. Richard Bryan (D-NV)). Fundraising is
"'sort of a necessary evil. You've got to raise the money to meet a given campaign budget... "
SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 2, at 74 (quoting Rep. Tim Penny (D-MN)). See also Paul S.
Herrnson and Ronald A. Faucheux, Candidates Devote Substantial Time and Effort to
Fundraising, July 7, 2000, available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/herrnson/reporttime.html
("[A]s the price for office increases candidates become increasingly beholden to fundraising
demands.").
30. There was no increase in individual contribution limits for nearly three decades, between
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) as amended in 1974 ($1,000 per person per election
cycle) and today's limits, as set in McCain Feingold ($2,000). This change is codified in the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2000 & West.
Supp. 2002). Note also that the basic structure of the relevant federal law was re-shaped in large
part by the Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See infra text
accompanying notes 80-85 (holding that the law limiting campaign expenditures was not
sufficiently supported by a compelling governmental interest and violated the First Amendment).
31. "Very few Americans contribute to political parties and candidates in the United States,
and the percentage who do contribute has remained relatively stable during the past twenty years,
even as the costs of elections have increased. Consequently, candidates need to spend more and
more time trying to raise money from a very narrow donor base." Candance J. Nelson, Spending
in the 2000 Elections, in FINANCING THE 2000 ELECTION 35-38 (David Magleby ed., 2002).
"Failure to index contribution limits for inflation spawned an important new role for money
brokers and intensified the money chase." Thomas E. Mann, Lessons for Reforms, in FINANCING
THE 2000 ELECTION, supra, at 239.
32. BCRA, enacted in 2002, raised limits from $1,000 to $2,000, the first increase since the
1974 FECA amendments. But $2,000 in 2002 dollars is still a sharp decrease from the $1,000
limit of 1974-that $1,000 was the equivalent of $3,649.64 in 2002. Even though the limit was
doubled, a $2,000 contribution in 2005 is only worth about half of what a $1,000 contribution
would have been worth in 1974.
33. Compare SCHRAM, supra note 8 (providing remarks of politicians regarding campaign
financing), and MAKINSON, supra note 8 (discussing different Congress members' viewpoints
regarding the time it takes to adequately campaign), with Blasi, supra note 3, at 1282 (noting that
a goal of campaign finance reform should be the time protection of officeholders).
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attributes of that money chase to show that it is increasingly time
consuming, 34 geographically far-flung, 35 and focused on an elite set of
donors.
36
1. Time Demands of the Money Chase
In terms of time, for example, Representative Bill McCollum said,
"When I was here in Washington I would go over to the NRCC
[National Republican Congressional Committee] or the Senatorial
Committee offices to make telephone calls [for] an hour, two hours
every day. When I was home in Florida... that's the bulk of what I
did. It's a very time-consuming process[.]" 37
House Minority Leader Robert Michel decried both the escalation of
costs and the time taken to raise the money needed for a campaign.
"I ran my first campaign [in 1956] for $15,000. And then by the time I
got to my toughest campaign in '82, it was $600,000 .... When I look
around the country and see some of these multimillion-dollar races, I
just have to be concerned about that. The time that you spend raising
money, and the number of fund-raising events I was obliged to attend
or at least stop by-osh, you'd have five or six a night. It just wears
you out doing that."
The campai n money chase dominates candidates' time every day,
day after day.
3I
2. Travel Demands of the Money Chase
Not only does the money chase take time, it also takes the candidate
34. See infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing the time demands of the money chase).
35. See infra Part ll.B.2 (discussing the travel demands of the money chase).
36. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the elite donor class of the money chase).
37. MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 36-37 (quoting Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL)).
38. SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 38 (quoting House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-
IL)). Even those who did not necessarily see a detrimental impact on daily operations saw the
drain on time:
"I don't think the campaign fund-raising affected the day-to-day operations of
Congress. I think the one thing it did do was to take up a good deal of the amount of
time of members of Congress, particularly those who came from very competitive
districts, and those who were contemplating statewide races in large states."
Id. at 43 (quoting Rep. Bill Green (R-NY)).
39. The system is "'compromised by the fact that you have to spend so much time doing it."'
Id. at pt. I, § 1, at 16 (quoting Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ)).
"Someone in a relatively safe seat may be free of thinking about a campaign until the
last six months or so of a two-year term. At that time, that person becomes a candidate
and not a member of Congress for all practical purposes. Someone like me, in a very
marginal seat, begins thinking about reelection a day or so after he is sworn in for a
new term-if he wants to get reelected."
Id. at pt. I, § 3, at 44 (quoting Rep. Jim Bacchus (D-FL)).
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to great geographical distances. Candidates and elected officials cast a
wide net in order to raise the money needed to run a successful
campaign. They reach out beyond their immediate circles of friends,
past voters and constituents, and outside their home region, in the
pursuit of that precious commodity, campaign cash. 40 Returning to the
example of South Dakota in 2004, 92% of the money raised by
incumbent Senator Tom Daschle came from outside of the state, as did
78% of that raised by his opponent, Jon Thune.41 A breakdown of 2004
fundraising data shows a chase to several hot spots around the country
with high levels of campaign contributions, with the New York City
metropolitan area being the leader at nearly $150 million, and
Washington D.C. not far behind at $135.4 million.4 2 Other stops on the
campaign money tour include Los Angeles and San Francisco on the
west coast, Chicago in the Midwest, and Boston and Philadelphia on the
east coast. 43  Combined, these seven metropolitan areas account for
over $600 million in individual campaign contributions. As a result,
candidates spend much of their time flying back and forth across the
country-from New York to Hollywood, with a stop in Chicago,
perhaps-raising money. 45 As Senator Wyche Fowler commented: "'It
takes two to three years of constant travel-you cannot, under today's
system, raise [enough] money in your own state. And therefore, the
time expands exponentially, because you're crisscrossing the
country .... ."'46 And the crisscrossing takes candidates to people they
never have met, and may never have reason to see again, but for the
40. SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3 (offering perspectives from former lawmakers on
campaign fundraising). For the top 10 most expensive Senate races from 2004, reflecting the 20
major party candidates, the average candidate received 39.1% of her funds from out-of-state
contributors. This data was compiled from information published by CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, 2004 ELECTION OVERVIEW, www.opensecrets.org (follow "2004 Election Overview"
under "Election Overview" tab) (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
41. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SOUTH DAKOTA SENATE: 2004 RACE PROFILE,
www.opensecrets.org/races/index.asp (select "South Dakota"; then follow "Election Races" and
select "2004") (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
42. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 2004 ELECTION OVERVIEW: TOP METRO AREAS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topmetro.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. As one House member put it,
"[P]eople would be genuinely unhappy about how much time members have to spend
on fund-raising.... And in many cases, because there is such competition for the
dollars, you can't do it over the phone. You've got to get on a plane and fly to New
York or Chicago or Miami or Dallas or Los Angeles. Hollywood, Wall Street. And
that's a couple of day trip-a lot of schmoozing."
SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 40-41 (quoting Rep. Dennis Eckart (D-OH)).
46. Id. at 42 (quoting Sen. Wyche Fowler(D-GA)).
2006]
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need for cash.47 Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona reflected on a
fundraising event as follows: "'And I'm in New York. Beautiful
apartment facing the park. I'd never been there before. Didn't know the
people who owned the apartment, who'd just raised me 46,000
bucks."' 4
8
3. The Elite Donor Class of the Money Chase
Not only are candidates chasing money outside of their districts, they
are lavishing attention on a wealthy and elite donor class, taking time
away from the many.4 9 The Center for Responsive Politics reports,
"[1]ess than one-tenth of 1 percent of the U.S. population gave 83
percent of all itemized campaign contributions for the 2002 elections.
5°
Donors who max out, i.e., give the maximum $2,000 allowed under law,
represent alfproximately one-tenth of one percent of the nation's adult
population. Candidates focus on these givers with programs like
Rangers and Pioneers, who focus on raising hundreds of thousands of
dollars from those who max out.52 This time is spent not with every day
voters and constituents, but rather on the wealthy few who can help the
candidate most quickly reach fundraising goals.
C. Conflicts With Job Performance
While the time and efforts spent raising money have increased, the
number of hours in a day has not. Something must give. 53  Large
47. While exposure to a broad range of individuals can provide salutary benefits, the
transactional approach of modem politics does not. The money chase becomes an end to itself, so
that meetings become entirely transactional, and the question becomes: what can you give (or get)
me, and what will be expected in return.
48. SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 2, at 34-36 (quoting Sen. DeConcini (D-AZ)).
49. This terminology is effectively described and developed in Spencer Overton, The Donor
Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 73 (2004).
50. Press Release, Center for Responsive Politics, Big-time Donors Small in Number (Dec.
11, 2002), http://www.opensecrets.org/pressreleases/DonorDemographics02.asp.
51. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 2004 ELECTION OVERVIEW: DONOR
DEMOGRAPHICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/DonorDemographics.asp (last visited
Feb. 16, 2006). Contributions of $200 or more come from about one-half of one percent (0.52%)
of the nation's population. Id.
52. During the Bush re-election campaign, those who pledged to raise $200,000 were in a
special club called the "Rangers," with each typically targeting one hundred people to max out.
Thomas B. Edsall & Sarah Cohen, Bush Campaign Raises A Record $49.5 Million; For Their
Efforts, Fundraisers Also Gain, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at AI. The "Pioneers" are another
group, first established in the 2000 election cycle, when the contribution ceiling was $1,000, for
those who could raise $100,000 (presumably one hundred people giving $1000 each). Id.
Senator Kerry apparently had "Vice-Chairs," who raised at least $100,000, and "Co-Chairs," who
raised at least $50,000. WhiteHouseForSale.org, Dean & Kerry Fundraising,
http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/demfundraising/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
53. "Members, like everybody else, have only so much time in the day. And it's packed
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blocks of a candidate's time are spent fundraising,54 as opposed to
engaging with constituents, debating (literally or figuratively)
opponents, or discussing ideas.55  Candidates "hardly ha[ve] time to
genuinely stop, look, and listen to the people [they are] going to
represent." 56  Because they are consumed with fundraising, candidates
do not have time during their campaigns to engage the issues or the
voters.
57
In addition, testimonial evidence from Members of Congress reflects
that they do not devote as much time to doing their jobs in service to the
public as they would like because they spend so much time raising
money. 58 The money chase is, in one Member's words, "'[a] very real
distraction from the real business of legislating.' 59 It takes time away
from the job and forces a choice: do the people's business or raise
and crowded with constituents, committee hearings, floor statements, oversight
responsibilities, and too often, fundraising calls. And when you're balancing all those things
together, especially those members in marginal and competitive races, they are forced too
often to spend too much of their time dialing for dollars rather than sitting in their committee
room and protecting the dollars of their constituents. You know, the dialing for dollars is to
get somebody elected. The protecting the dollars is one of the primary legislative
responsibilities. And too often, one comes at the expense of the other."
MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 39-40 (quoting Rep. Tim Roemer (D-IN)).
54. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley, Senate Hopefuls Focus on Money, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 11,
2004, at 24A (describing statements by former Representative Robert Schaffer that he was
spending "120 percent" of his time fundraising in the Republican primary for Senate).
55. See Bob Warner, Critics Tread on Street/Blast Mayoral Hopeful for Remarks on Fund-
Raising, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 1999, at 15 (quoting the mayoral candidate as saying that
the continued escalation of fundraising has "changed the whole tenor of political campaigns," and
that if the incumbent "had less money to spend on 30-second campaign ads, he would be more
willing to engage in debates and other joint appearances, giving voters more chances to evaluate
the mayoral candidates face to face.").
56. 133 CONG. REc. S7782 (daily ed. June 9, 1987) (Statement of Sen. Hollings).
57. See, eg., SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 42 ("I did raise a lot of money, particularly
in my Senate race, and it just drained my time and ability to do anything else. It just crippled my
ability to do my job properly in my final term, or to run an effective campaign beyond the
fundraising part of it." (quoting Rep. Mel Levine (D-CA))).
58. Former Representative Bob Edgar commented that during an election "'[elighty percent of
my time, 80% of my staff's time, 80% of my events and meetings were fundraisers. Rather than
go to a senior center, I would go to a party where I could raise $3,000 or $4,000."' Marty Jezer,
et al., A Proposal for Democratically Financed Congressional Elections, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 333, 341 (1993) (quoting PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 119
(1998)). Sen. Howard Metzenbaum echoed this sentiment and indicated that elected officials
would prefer to spend their time serving the public:
"You'd like to be spending your time on legislation-on the floor of the Senate, in
committees, with staff, deciding what other projects you want to be involved in. But
the end-all and be-all is to have sufficient money to run your campaign. So that which
you should be doing doesn't always get the first priority."
SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 43 (quoting Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH)).
59. SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 38 (quoting Rep. Leslie Byrne (D-VA)).
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money for the next campaign. "'[Fundraising] just drained my time and
ability to do anything else' It just crippled my ability to do my job
properly... or to run an effective campaign beyond the fund-raising
part of it.'"6 The time lost is time that could instead be spent doing the
people's business, such as studying legislation, debating policy, and
voting on bills.
The money chase takes elected officials away from their work in
other ways. Members of Congress are not allowed to make fundraising
calls from their congressional offices61 and they therefore typically rent
office space on Capitol Hill for those purposes.62 This usually involves
an effective extension or conversion of their prior campaign fundraising
operation immediately after election.63  This sets up a strange ritual
dance in Washington because the pull to raise money is so strong and
Members of Congress are inexorably drawn to these fundraising
bunkers. "'I rented an office on Capitol Hill, and between votes [in the
House] during the time I was running for the Senate, I just camped out
in that office most of the time and made phone calls."' 64 Particularly
during peak times, every free moment is turned over to the march for
money, instead of the people's business.
65
60. Id. at 42 (quoting Rep. Mel Levine (D-CA)).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1) (2000 & West. Supp. 2002).
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive a donation of money or other
thing of value in connection with a Federal, State, or local election from a person who
is located in a room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an
officer or employee of the United States. It shall be unlawful for an individual who is
an officer or employee of the Federal Government, including the President, Vice
President, and Members of Congress, to solicit or receive a donation of money or other
thing of value in connection with a Federal, State, or local election, while in any room
or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an officer or employee of the
United States, from any person.
Id.
62. In addition, they will venture to the party headquarters and campaign offices on Capitol
Hill for these purposes. MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 36 (noting the comments of Rep. Bill
McCollum about traveling to the National Republican Congressional Committee, whose offices
are on Capitol Hill, just two blocks from the House Office Buildings).
63. "'We started the day after Election Day, and I kept the campaign finance office going year
round, making calls, working on mailings, planning fund-raising events."' SCHRAM, supra note
8, pt. I, § 3, at 43-44 (quoting Rep. Bill Green (R-NY)).
64. Id. at 42 (quoting Rep. Mel Levine (D-CA)).
65. MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 36.
"[Any time I got an hour, literally, I would leave my [congressional] office and go up
to the fundraising office to make calls.... Nothing came in unless I made a call....
And it's not just one call, often you'd have to make many, many calls because
someone was out of town .... So there was this constant flow back and forth of phone
calls."
Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Bryan (D-NV)).
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While the government continues to operate, the fundraising demands
and the running back and forth take a significant toll on the daily
schedule of legislative business. Former Senate Majority Leader
George Mitchell observed that virtually every day, as he was setting the
legislative calendar, he would be called and asked not to schedule
legislative business at certain times, due to fundraising obligations.
66
The demand was so great as to be able to stop the Senate entirely from
doing its work: "'If I put all the requests together, the Senate would
never vote. I once had my staff keep a list of such requests on one
day... and had I honored all of the requests, there could not have been
a vote that day."' 67 Some just would routinely miss important votes due
to conflicts with their fundraising activities. 6  In a survey of House and
Senate members and their staffs, the Center for Responsive Politics
found that 52 percent of the senators surveyed thought the demands of
fundraising cut significantly into the time available for legislative work,
and another 12 percent believed fundraising had some deleterious
effect.
69
66. SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 37-38.
"As Senate Majority Leader, one of my responsibilities has been to schedule the
operations of the Senate. And I can say to you that there's hardly a day in the past six
years when I've been Majority Leader when one or more senators hasn't called me and
asked me not to have a vote at a certain time... One of the most common reasons is
that they are either holding or attending a fund-raising event that evening, either in
Washington or outside Washington.."
Id. (quoting Sen. George Mitchell (D-ME)); see also John Harwood, For California Senator,
Fund Raising Becomes Overwhelming Burden, WALL ST. J., Mar, 2, 1994, at A8 (noting that
Senator George Mitchell "is often pestered by colleagues who don't want floor votes to conflict
with fundraisers, and sometimes obliges them"); Senator Richard Bryan has stated,
"There were many, many weeks in which no votes would be scheduled late. Or no
votes would be held because the Democrats had their major fundraising event....
And then the leadership was increasingly under pressure from the members: 'Gosh
don't schedule a vote here, protect me, I've got to be in New York for this fundraiser
or that.' I mean that is the impact on the institution in terms of time management."
MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 40 (quoting Sen. Richard Bryan (D-NV)).
67. SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 38 (quoting Sen. George Mitchell (D-ME)). The
requests "covered the period from nine a.m. until midnight." Id.
68. See, e.g., Greg Krikorian, California and the West; Campaign Cuts Into Campbell's
Voting Record, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2000, at A3 (detailing Rep. Campbell's abysmal attendance
record in Congress while campaigning for United States Senate). "Campbell says he has no
choice but to miss votes in a system that demands huge amount of campaign money-a system he
wants to change. And his opponent [Senator Diane Feinstein] is a well known, well financed
incumbent." Id.
69. See PETER LINDSTROM, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, CONGRESS SPEAKS-A
SURVEY OF THE 100TH CONGRESS 92 (1988) (calculating the responses of congressional
representatives); MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 39-40 (" ' [Tihe dialing for dollars is to get
somebody elected. The protecting the dollars [of their constituents] is one of the primary
legislative responsibilities. And too often, one comes at the expense of the other."' (quoting Rep.
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The 2004 presidential election cycle provides the best-or perhaps
worst-example of the problem addressed in these pages, and how the
number of hours spent raising these vast sums is time lost to the
American people.70  Both major party nominees, President George W.
Bush and U.S. Senator John F. Kerry decided to forego the public
financing available in the primaries. Together, they raised nearly half a
billion dollars prior to accepting their respective parties' nominations.
7 1
In effect, they raised money at a pace of at least one million dollars per
day, every day for sixteen months, while also serving as federal
officeholders. In order to do so, surely they could not have been
performing all of their job functions as they might have otherwise,
without the demands of fundraising.
Based on increasing campaign costs and the need for candidates to
raise sufficient funds to meet those expenditures, candidates now face
significant fundraising demands. Fundraising activity takes time away
from candidates, many of whom are already officeholders, as they seek
out money all around the country from a select few. This is time taken
away from interactions with voters and, in the case of candidates who
Tom Roemer (D-IND))); SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 38 (quoting Rep. Leslie Byrne (D-
VA)).
70. Admittedly, each candidate has teams of full-time staffers and others, like Pioneers and
Rangers, working on their fundraising, and their networks are national, so that no candidate is
acting alone. But the amount of time spent fundraising is dedicated to so many different types of
activities. The largest bulk is on telephone calls, but there is a significant donation of time to
fundraising events themselves, managing teams of fundraisers and other administrative aspects of
raising tens, or even hundreds of millions of dollars. In other words, candidates can always
delegate some responsibilities, but in the end, they must put in the time themselves and, in one
form or another "make the ask" and manage those who are managing the fundraising operation.
71. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE GEORGE W. BUSH
(R), http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/sunmary.asp?ID=NO0008072 (last visited Feb. 16,
2006), for statistics on Bush's fundraising, and CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JOHN KERRY (D),
http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/summary.asp?D=N00000245 (last visited Feb. 16,
2006), for statistics on Kerry's fundraising. Major party candidates are entitled to a base of
$20,000,000 in public funds for the general presidential election, with a cost of living adjustment
calculated with 1974 as the base year. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, PUBLIC FUNDING OF
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BROCHURE (2005),
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtm#7. In 2004, the cost-of-living-adjusted
number came to $74.62 million, which was paid to the campaigns of Pres. Bush and Sen. Kerry.
Id.
72. Another way to look at it is that they were pulling in campaign cash at the rate of $41,667
an hour, or $694 every minute. These amounts are continuously rising. For example, in the 2000
primaries, sitting Vice President Al Gore, the eventual Democratic Party nominee, raised a total
of $33.9 million in individual contributions. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, RECEIPTS OF
1999-2000 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS THROUGH JULY 31, 2000,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/precm8.htm. Seeking the Republican Party's nomination in 2000,
then-Governor George W. Bush raised $91.3 million in individual contributions. Id.
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are already officeholders, time stolen from the people's business.
Public officials are consequently not doing the jobs they have been
elected to do because of these fundraising demands, but are instead
focused on raising money.
III. DEMONSTRATING A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN TIME
PROTECTION
This Part will evaluate the campaign money chase problem in the
context of case law and constitutional jurisprudence. First, this Part will
briefly discuss Buckley v. Valeo, the controlling United States Supreme
Court decision in the campaign finance reform arena, which holds that
campaign finance limitations must be supported by a "compelling
government interest." 73 This Part will next describe how lower courts
have defined "compelling government interest" in light of Buckley and
will go on to reveal the circuit split regarding limitations on campaign
expenditures and the time protection rationale.74 Finally, this Part will
examine the various reasons why the time protection rationale creates a
compelling government interest in campaign finance reform.
75
A. Buckley v. Valeo-Reforms Must Serve a Compelling Government
Interest
Government restrictions on fundamental liberties will be held
unconstitutional unless they can survive strict scrutiny.76 As the First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech,77 a fundamental liberty, the
Court has held that any restrictions on free speech must survive this
most exacting scrutiny.78  When considering political speech,
particularly in the campaign finance context, Buckley controls. 79 The
73. See infra Part II.A (discussing Buckley v. Valeo which held that campaign finance limit
laws must meet strict scrutiny).
74. See infra Part III.B-C (examining the effect Buckley has had on the Court's definition of a
compelling government interest and the development of a circuit split on time protection).
75. See infra Part III.D (examining the time protection rationale in light of a compelling
government interest).
76. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 764-68 (2d
ed. 2002).
77. The First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. But strict scrutiny must be strict in theory, not fatal in fact. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and
well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of
messages expressed by private individuals." Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641 (1994).
79. "Any judicial consideration of the constitutionality of campaign finance reform legislation
20061
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Buckley Court in effect equated money and speech, holding that laws
restricting campaign contributions or expenditures must meet exacting
scrutiny.80 In Buckley, the Court faced a challenge to the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA), and most notably for these purposes,
challenges to provisions providing limits on campaign contributions and
expenditures. The Court addressed this as a First Amendment
concern, meriting the highest scrutiny-narrowly tailored means to
achieve a compelling government interest.82  To further frame its
analysis, as a broad matter of principle, the Court held that preserving
the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" serves a
compelling government interest.8 3  Specifically, the Court identified
FECA's primary purpose-to limit actual and apparent corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions-and upheld
contribution limits as narrowly tailored to serve this compelling
government interest.84 But the Court also held that the portion of FECA
that limited campaign expenditures was not sufficiently supported by a
compelling 8government interest and hence violated the First
Amendment.
In FECA, as amended in 1974, Congress had created a parallel
structure that limited both campaign contributions and expenditures.
86
must begin and usually ends with the comprehensive decision in Buckley." Kruse v. City of
Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Homans v. City of Albuquerque (Homans
1), 217 F. Supp. 2d. 1197, 1204 (D.N.M. 2002) ("Buckley v. Valeo is the 'seminal case governing
the constitutional review of campaign finance reform efforts, including expenditure limitations."'
(quoting Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2002));
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1186-1187 (10th Cir.
2000); Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 767 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
80. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976) ("[T]he constitutionality of § 608 (e)(1)
[limiting campaign expenditures] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its
support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of
political expression.").
81. Id. The challenge was brought by U.S. Senator Buckley and a variety of candidates,
political parties, and contributors. FECA also provided for public financing of presidential
campaigns and numerous reporting requirements, and some much less noteworthy provisions. Id.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 26-27.
84. Id. at 26 ("It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose to limit the actuality
and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions in order to
find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.").
85. The Court "f ou]nd that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify § 608 (e)(1)'s ceiling on independent
expenditures." Id. at 45.
86. Id. at 23 ("Section 608 (b) provides, with certain limited exceptions, that "no person shall
make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the
aggregate, exceed $1,000;"); id. at 39 ("The most drastic of the limitations restricts individuals
and groups, including political parties that fail to place a candidate on the ballot, to an
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But the Buckley Court struck down expenditure caps while leaving
contribution caps in place,87 setting a path to the problem that exists
today. This unintended consequence arose because spending,
unrestrained under FECA post-Buckley, has continued to rise rapidly.
But with limits on contributions, the growing demand for money easily
outpaces the ability to tap the restricted supply.8 8 The result has been to
undermine the integrity of representative democracy.
89
expenditure of $1,000 'relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year.' § 608
(e)(1). Other expenditure ceilings limit spending by candidates, § 608 (a), their campaigns, § 608
(c), and political parties in connection with election campaigns, § 608 (f)[.]").
87. The Court saw different First Amendment implications in contributions as compared to
expenditures, opening the door for differing treatment of their regulation. See id. at 23
("[A]lthough the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First
Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on
protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial
contributions."). The Buckley Court upheld contribution limits. Id. at 26 ("It is unnecessary to
look beyond the Act's primary purpose to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions in order to find a constitutionally sufficient
justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation."). But the Court struck down expenditure
limits. Id. at 44.
We turn then to the basic First Amendment question whether § 608 (e)(1)...
impermissibly burdens the constitutional right of free expression. The Court of Appeals
summarily held the provision constitutionally valid on the ground that 'section 608(e)
is a loophole-closing provision only' that is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
contribution limitations. We cannot agree.
Id. (citation omitted).
88. See supra Part Il.A (discussing the rising sums raised and spent in political campaigns).
89.. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The plain fact is that the compromise the Court invented in Buckley set the stage for a
new kind of speech to enter the political system. It is covert speech. The Court has
forced a substantial amount of speech underground, as contributors and candidates
devise ever more elaborate methods of avoiding contribution limits, limits which take
no account of rising campaign costs.
Id. Justice Kennedy also identified covert speech as an unintended consequence of Buckley. "It
is our duty to face up to adverse, unintended consequences flowing from our own prior
decisions." Id. at 407. See also Thomas E. Mann, Lessons for Reformers, FINANCING THE 2000
ELECTION, supra note 31, at 238 ("These overriding realities [of the constant evasion of
campaign finance laws] are encompassed in the infamous Law of Unintended Consequences: the
intended purposes of campaign finance regulation will inevitably be overwhelmed by effects not
desired or anticipated."); Blasi, supra note 3, at 1307-08:
The recent increase in time devoted to fund-raising did not evolve "naturally." Rather,
it developed in response to the patchwork legislative scheme that was left standing
after the selective invalidations of Buckley v. Valeo: no limits on overall spending,
severe limits on the size of contributions, and no limits on independent expenditures
for and against particular candidates. The war chest mentality was born of this
regulatory residue. Had the 1974 campaign finance law at issue in Buckley either never
been passed or been upheld in its entirety, the quest for contributions would look very
different. Almost certainly, it would be far less time consuming because either
candidates would not seek to raise so much money (if they couldn't spend beyond a set
limit) or they could raise it much more efficiently (by means of large contributions).
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B. Compelling Government Interest in Spending Limits Post-Buckley
What can be done to reverse the tide? Any responsive campaign
finance reform, and specifically spending limits, must be narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling government interest.9° Still, that interest
must be identified. This Section first will explore the possibility that a
sufficiently compelling government interest in limiting campaign
expenditures may continue to exist after Buckley.9 1 This Section then
will consider the various circumstances in which courts have identified
a compelling government interest since Buckley.92
1. Buckley Leaves Open the Possibility to Limit Campaign Spending
While Buckley held that a sufficiently compelling government
interest had not been identified to justify the expenditure limits, the
possibility has remained that one could be developed.93 For example,
Justice Kennedy recently wrote: "I would leave open the possibility that
Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which there
are some limits on both expenditures and contributions, thus permitting
office holders to concentrate their time and efforts on official duties
rather than on fundraising." 94  Similarly, Justice Breyer, in an opinion
Id.
90. The Court has used various ways to describe narrow tailoring. In general, "[ilf strict
scrutiny is used, a relatively close fit is required: in fact, the government will have to show that
the means is necessary-the least restrictive alternative-to achieve the goal." CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 76, at 648. Strict scrutiny "ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate .... Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). In a university
affirmative action context, the Court explained that "narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion
of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between
maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational
opportunities to members of all racial groups." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
However, "narrow tailoring does... require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks." Id. at 340.
91. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the possibility of a compelling government interest in
limiting campaign spending).
92. See infra Part Ifl.B.2 (examining other situations that courts have identified as compelling
government interest since Buckley was decided).
93. See Homans 11, 366 F.3d 900, 906-07 (10th Cir. 2004) ("'Buckley... is not a broad
pronouncement declaring all campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional,' and... it remains
possible to develop a factual record that would sustain such restrictions .... [I]t might be
possible to devise a system of campaign-expenditure limits that would survive exacting
scrutiny[.]" (quoting Kruse v. City of Cincinatti, 142 F.3d 907,920 (6th Cir. 1998)).
94. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
qualified this statement by hinting that perhaps he would vote with Justices Thomas and Scalia to
strike down contribution limits. Id. Further, while some might read Justice Kennedy's vehement
dissent in McConnell to mean he has joined Justices Thomas and Scalia on this issue, nothing in
the Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC dissent really implicated the time-protection issue.
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joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that, particularly in light of post-
Buckley developments, legislatures could find compelling reasons to
enact campaign finance reform laws, so as to "protect the integrity of
the electoral process."
95
Lower court judges also note this opening. For example, a majority
in the Second Circuit observed that, "after Buckley, there remains the
possibility that a legislature could identify a sufficiently strong interest,
and develop a supporting record, such that some expenditure limits
could survive constitutional review. ' 96  A concurrence in the Sixth
Circuit offers a similar perspective: "It may be possible to develop a
factual record to establish that the interest in freeing officeholders from
the pressures of fundraising so they can perform their duties, . .. is
compelling, and that campaign expenditure limits are a narrowly
tailored means of serving such an interest." 97  The door is open for
change to enter.
2. Identifying a Compelling Government Interest
The Court has found a compelling government interest in myriad
activities that relate to the healthy functioning of representative
democracy. For example, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
the Court held, "Preserving the integrity of the electoral process. .. and
'sustaining the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a
democracy for the wise conduct of government' are interests of the
highest importance... . Preservation of the individual citizen's
confidence in government is equally important." 98 The Court has also
found a compelling government interest in: preventing voter
intimidation and election fraud; 99 "preserv[ing] of the integrity of the
electoral process and regulating the number of candidates on the ballot
95. Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Landell H, 382 F.3d 91, 108 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005) (affirming
the time protection rationale as a compelling government interest).
97. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 920 (6th Cir. 1998) (Cohn, D.J., concurring).
In the Tenth Circuit, Judge Lucero wrote that Buckley did not address the time protection
rationale that is being urged here. Homans 11, 366 F.3d 900, 911 (10th. Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 1002 (2004). But majorities in these two cases from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
ultimately disagree with the Second Circuit opinion. See also Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523
(6th Cir. 1998) (following Kruse to strike down expenditure limits in state judicial elections).
98. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978) (striking down a law
that prohibited banks and corporations from making certain political contributions and
expenditures). See also Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n. 14 (noting that
preservation of the integrity of the electoral process and avoiding voter confusion is a compelling
government interest); Storer v. Brow, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (holding that the state may act to
protect compelling "interest in the stability of its political system").
99. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
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to avoid undue voter confusion;"' 100 "avoiding confusion, deception, and
even frustration of the democratic process at the general election;"''
1
"stabili[zing] of [the] political system;" 10 2 and preventing erosion of
public "confidence in the system of representative Government. ' 10 3 In
sum, preserving the integrity of the electoral process is a compelling
government interest "basic to a democratic society,"' 10 4  broadly
encompassing many specific activities and many important ideological
concerns. 105
The Court has recognized other ways to protect the integrity of the
system in a manner that would demonstrate a compelling government
interest. 1° 6  For example, in Burson v. Freeman, '  the Court upheld
100. Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 782 n.14 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761
(1973)); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145
(1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
101. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1970) (citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 47 n.10).
102. Storer, 415 U.S. at 736 (upholding ballot access restrictions).
103. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).
104. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957) (reviewing a law regulating
corporation and union contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections).
105. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,66-68 (1976).
The governmental interests sought to be vindicated by the disclosure requirements...
fall into three categories. First, disclosure provides the electorate with information "as
to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate"
in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters to
place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible
solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's
financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely
to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.
Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.
This exposure may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes
either before or after the election. A public armed with information about a candidate's
most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that
may be given in return. And, as we recognized in Burroughs v. United States, 290
U.S., at 548, Congress could reasonably conclude that full disclosure during an election
campaign tends "to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections."
Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements
are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the
contribution limitations described above.
The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial
governmental interests.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
106. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 955 (1988) ("In order to
fully protect this interest in democracy, the Court has frequently accepted the government's
asserted compelling interests in preventing election fraud and corruption as justifying various
restraints on individual rights.").
107. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
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Tennessee statutes prohibiting vote solicitation and limiting the display
of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place on Election
Day, t8- holding that preventing voter intimidation and election fraud
were compelling government interests. 10 9 Both pre- and post-Buckley
case law have identified the stability of the system and integrity of the
electoral process as compelling governmental interests.
110
C. The Circuit Split
In addition to the compelling government interests identified above,
the time protection rationale has been raised as a justification for
limiting campaign spending. This Section discusses the conflicting
treatments of that rationale in the circuits, to show that this issue is ripe
for Supreme Court resolution.
1. Landell v. Sorrell: Time Protection is Sufficiently Compelling
In Landell v. Sorrell, the United States District Court for the District
of Vermont reviewed the expenditure limitation provisions of the 1997
Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act (Act 64).111 Upon reviewing
the full record, the court found that the quest for campaign contributions
caused incumbents to spend excessive time trying to raise funds.
112
That redistribution of time to fundraising significantly reduced the
amount of time spent legislating and attending to other official duties,
108. Id. at 211. The statutes in question were specifically designed to restrict election day
political speech, and had to survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 198.
109. Id. at 206. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978)
(holding that preventing corruption is a compelling government interest); Buckley, 424 U.S. at
26-27 (expressing a concern about protecting "the integrity of our system of representative
democracy"); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983) (discussing "the
legitimacy of the State's interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular
will in a general election"); cf Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986)
(addressing an argument that party labels confuse voters); Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisc. ex
rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 125-26 (1981) (acknowledging that there is a compelling
government interest is protecting the integrity of elections, but that interest does not outweigh a
national party's interest in electing its own delegates).
110. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) ("It appears obvious to us that the one-
year disaffiliation provision furthers the State's interest in the stability of its political system. We
also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling .. "); Am. Party of Tex. v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974) ("Appellants concede, as we think they must, that the
objectives ostensibly sought by the State, viz., preservation of the integrity of the electoral
process and regulating the number of candidates on the ballot to avoid undue voter confusion, are
compelling."); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) ("It is clear that preservation of
the integrity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid state goal.").
111. Landell v. Sorrell (Landell 1), 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Vt. 2000). Act 64 also includes
contribution limits, and other campaign reforms that, while significant in their own right, will not
be discussed here. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883 (2004 & West Supp. 2005).
112. Landell1, 118 F. Supp. 2d. at 482-83.
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ultimately diminishing the overall representation provided." 3
In passing Act 64, the Vermont legislature had determined, in part,
that "'candidates for statewide office were spending inordinate amounts
of time raising campaign funds."' 114  The evidence presented at trial
demonstrated that "the need to solicit money from large donors at times
turns legislators away from their official duties." 115 The court approved
the legislative finding that "[a]s a result of the legislature's vulnerability
to the demands of large contributors, the Vermont public perceives,
legitimately, that candidates frequently spend an excessive amount of
time fundraising and not enough time interacting with voters." 116 The
district court then considered whether Vermont's spending limits were
constitutional. Based on its review of the facts, the court held:
"Spending limits are an effective response to certain compelling
government interests not addressed in Buckley: (1) 'Freeing office
holders so they can perform their duties,' ... or, as Justice Kennedy put
it, 'permitting officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on
official duties rather than on fundraising."'
117
The district court saw a compelling interest in maximizing the
amount of time spent legislating and minimizing distractions to job
performance, concluding that "the state proved that each of these
concerns exist, and that Vermont's expenditure limits address them."
118
On the facts, the court found that Vermont's legislature identified a
compelling interest in time protection and legislated in an appropriate
manner to remedy the threat to its interest.1 19 Despite this finding, the
district court decided that it could not hold the expenditure limits at
113. Id. at 468 ("Evidence supporting these conclusions came from both Plaintiffs and
Defendants in the form of public perception, legislator perception, and expert opinion."). Despite
finding a compelling government interest in protecting this lost time, the court overturned Act
64's expenditure limits, on a belief that principles of stare decisis prevented holding otherwise.
Id. at 483.
114. Id. at 468 (quoting Vermont General Assembly Legislative Finding (a)(1)).
115. Id. Additionally, the court cited the testimony of Senator Cheryl Rivers, who testified
that she "had been asked, contrary to her wishes, to solicit potential donors. She was assigned to
call companies such as Electronic Data Systems . . . , a company that is not located in her district
and that she would have no reason to contact apart from the need for donations to the party." Id.
at 469.
116. Id. at 470.
117. Id. at 482-83 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 482 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)). The court noted that Justice Kennedy's
dissent, although not controlling, "reinforc[ed] the view that the constitutionality of expenditure
limits bears review and reconsideration." Id. at 482.
118. Id. at 483. Furthermore, the court realized that "[gliven the wealth of evidence gathered
by the Vermont legislature in the process of evaluating Act 64, this Court understands why it
included spending limits as part of its comprehensive campaign finance bill." Id.
119. Id.
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issue to be constitutional because it determined that Buckley was
controlling.12
0
On appeal, the Second Circuit took several steps in reviewing the
constitutionality of Act 64. First, the appellate court observed, as noted
above, that Buckley left open the question of whether facts could justify
finding a compelling government interest to support spending limits. 1
21
After reviewing the lengthy record below, the Second Circuit held that
as a matter of law, in addition to the well-established interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance thereof,1 22 time protection is a
compelling government interest.1 23 The court was convinced that both
as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, Vermont had sufficiently
established a compelling government interest in "protecting the time of
candidates and elected officials." 124  And spending limits could serve
this interest effectively, without improperly impeding campaigning or
speech rights. 1
25
A vigorous dissent from Judge Winter, on the original panel to hear
the matter, rejected the time protection argument, arguing that Buckley
foreclosed this line of inquiry, in part because it considered the question
three decades ago.126  Further, Judge Winter argued that the time
protection rationale is merely another way to limit spending for the sake
of equality, as opposed to being an independent ground on its own. On
denial of rehearing en banc,12 7 Judge Walker dissented, reiterating
Judge Winter's arguments regarding time protection, and further
arguing that expenditure limits improperly help entrench incumbents. 12
8
120. Id. Despite the court's finding of a compelling government interest, it overturned the
Act's expenditure provisions because the court found itself "bound by the doctrine of stare decisis
to adhere to Supreme Court precedent." Id.
121. Landell 11, 382 F.3d 91, 108 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005). See
supra Part III.B. I for a discussion of the time demands of campaign fundraising.
122. Landell 11, 382 F.3d at 124-25. Because limits on contributions alone have proved
insufficient to deter corruption, the Second Circuit further held that spending caps can also help
serve that interest.
123. Id. at 124.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 130-31. The appeals court remained open as to the issue of what means would
specifically be most narrowly tailored to fit the constitutionally-acceptable ends. Id. at 133-35.
Thus, upon first ruling, the Second Circuit remanded to the district court. Id. at 135-37. The
specific question of whether Vermont's law is sufficiently narrowly tailored has not been resolved
by the trial court, as the legal questions await resolution in the Supreme Court.
126. Id. at 192-94 (noting the time protection rationale) (Winter, J., dissenting). Interestingly,
Judge Winter argued Buckley thirty years prior. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 5 (1976).
127. Judge Calabresi concurred in the denial of rehearing en banc, specifically so as to press
the Supreme Court to reconsider the basic underpinnings of Buckley and this area of law.
128. Landell v. Sorrell (Landel 111), 406 F.3d 159, 167-175 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126
S. Ct. 35 (2005) (Walker, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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2. Homans v. Albuquerque
Challenges to campaign finance reform laws in Albuquerque, New
Mexico also provide an example of the dimensions and responses to the
time protection issue. The City of Albuquerque adopted limits on
spending 129 by candidates for city office through an amendment to the
city charter in 1974.130 The City had done so "[i]n response to the
increasingly apparent need to reform the ways in which political
campaigns are financed." 131  The City explained that "[t]he caps on
campaign spending serve numerous critically important governmental
interests, including ... freeing elected officials and candidates from the
endless burden of fundraising so that they may devote their time to the
business of government." 13
2
Albuquerque provides a unique long-term view of the successes of
spending limits. The spending limits effectively protected the time of
candidates and public officials and made for better campaigns. Under
the spending limits, the City experienced vigorous campaigns for office
that engaged the people. 1 3  Time that might have been otherwise
reserved for fundraising was occupied with other activities, such as
direct voter contact. 134  The citizens of Albuquerque experienced
competitive elections, greater participation, and elevated voter turnout
and public confidence.' 3 5  In addition, the spending limits were well-
129. Homans II, 366 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Albuquerque City Charter, art.
XIII, sec. 4(d)).
130. Id. The spending limits applicable to the October 2, 2001 elections for mayor and city
councilor were $174,720 and $17,056, respectively. Id. at 903 (citing Albuquerque City Charter,
art. XIII, sec. 4(d)). Note also that these limits were put in place pre-Buckley but somehow
managed to stay essentially intact until just recently. Id. In 1999, pursuant to an amendment to
the City Election Code, the applicable spending limits were doubled to an amount equal to twice
the annual salary of the office. Id. (noting that limits were in effect from 1974 to 1995, enjoined
in 1997, and restored for the 1999 election).
131. Id.
132. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Honans 11, 366 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. CIV-01-917 MV),
http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/albuquerque/homans/Ahomansprelim.pdf, at 1-2. See also
Anthony Gierzynski, Ph. D., Albuquerque Election Financing,
http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/albuquerque/electionfinancinganalysis.pdf (last visited Feb. 16,
2006) (citing Marc Bernado, Election Code, Code of Ethics Win Approval, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Feb. 27, 1974, at Al).
133. See Gierzynski, supra note 132, at 4 (stating that limits did not favor incumbents and that
"democracy in Albuquerque is actually as healthy, if not healthier than other cities").
134. As the district court observed, "[c]andidates in elections where spending limits are
imposed tend to spend more campaign money on actual voter contact." Homans 1, 217 F. Supp.
2d 1197, 1201 (D.N.M. 2002).
135. In Albuquerque mayoral elections, challengers were far more successful against
incumbents than in mayoral elections in other cities without spending limits. Id. at 1200-01
(finding voter turnout in Albuquerque mayoral and city council elections healthy compared to
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received and promoted public confidence in Albuquerque local
government. 136 On the whole, Albuquerque's spending limits protected
the time of candidates and officeholders and enhanced the political
process.
Mayoral candidate Rick Homans challenged the law,137 and argued
that the spending limits violated his First Amendment rights. 138  The
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico found as a
matter of fact that Albuquerque had "demonstrated that these
expenditure limitations are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
interests of... permitting candidates and officeholders to spend less
time fundraising and more time performing their duties as
representatives and interacting with voters [and] increasing voter
interest in and connection to the electoral system."13 9  But due to a
constrained application of Buckley, the court ordered the limits repealed
in 2001.140
The case continued after the spending caps were rescinded, with the
comparative experience of the 2001 elections thrown into the mix. The
federal trial court made findings of fact favorable to the City, noting that
other cities and that small donors play much bigger role in campaign financing in Albuquerque
than in comparable cities without spending limits).
136. A survey showed that 71% of Albuquerque voters believed the spending limits have
improved the "fairness of elections by ensuring that ordinary citizens, not just the very wealthy,
can run for office in the City without having to raise so much money from special interest
groups." Id. at 1202. As a comparison, 57% of voters strongly believe that elections for federal
office-without spending limits-are overly influenced by special interest money, while only
23% said the same of Albuquerque elections. Id. at 1201. Overall, 57% of surveyed voters
"strongly favor the current spending limits." Id. at 1201-02.
137. Sander Rue, a candidate for city councilor, also challenged the Albuquerque law on
similar grounds. Homans 11, 366 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 2004). Following discovery, the
district court granted Rue's motion for summary judgment on October 11, 2002. The district
court's decision did not discuss the factual evidence submitted by the parties. Instead, the court
held that the constitutionality of the spending limit was foreclosed as a matter of law by the
decision of the Tenth Circuit, discussed infra, granting an injunction pending appeal to Homans,
and by the Homans district court's subsequent final judgment. As the Rue proceedings deferred
so heavily to the Homans matter, the Rue case will not be addressed further. Further, the final
Tenth Circuit opinion consolidates the two cases for resolution together.
138. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (D.N.M. 2001). The
district court initially granted a temporary restraining order on August 20, 2001. Id. However, on
September 1, 2001, the court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
the spending limit for the upcoming October election. Id. at 1274. The parties submitted the case
to the district court for a ruling on the merits, based on the record compiled at the preliminary
injunction hearing, together with additional evidence submitted by stipulation. Id. at 1268.
139. Homans 1, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. The district court also found that the limits served
the City's interests in "deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption, promoting public
confidence in government.., and promoting an open and robust public debate by encouraging
electoral competition." Id.
140. Id. at 1206-07.
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"unlimited spending.., has a detrimental impact on the local electoral
process." 141  Fundraising consumed candidates and officeholders, as
campaign spending skyrocketed without expenditure limits. 142 As then
Mayor Jim Baca commented: "As a result of this new money chase in
this year's mayoral election in Albuquerque, I am now forced to spend
three hours every day making fundraising phone calls. I have never
before had to do this in my political career." 143  The Albuquerque
experience affirmed the positive correlation between time protection
and campaign expenditure limits.144
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit offered a different perspective than the
Second Circuit and viewed Buckley as an absolute bar to spending
limits: "under Buckley such restrictions cannot be supported as a matter
of law." 145 Due to its perception that Buckley posed an insurmountable
obstacle, the Tenth Circuit avoided much of the hard legal analysis of
the time protection rationale. The Court did not, however, reject the
time protection rationale; instead the Tenth Circuit held "that
Albuquerque's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the City, fails to demonstrate that expenditure limits are necessary to
further a compelling state interest."' 14 6 One judge on the panel differed
141. Id. at 1202.
142. "As the cost of elections rise, candidates for office at every level of federal, state, and
city government are under a great deal of pressure to engage in fundraising activities and to
depend on the good will of their donors." Id. at 1201.
143. Homans II, 366 F.3d 900, 912 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 2 Homans Doc. 24, at 512).
144. See Homans 1, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-06 (noting the contributions and expenditures of
the Albuquerque elections). Notwithstanding its view of the facts, the district court was
"constrained" by the Tenth Circuit's interpretation that Buckley, as a matter of law, imposes a per
se ban on any expenditure limits. Id. at 1204-06. Accordingly, the district court entered
judgment in favor of Homans' First Amendment claim, granting a permanent injunction against
further enforcement of the spending limit. Id. at 1204-06. The district court viewed a Tenth
Circuit ruling granting an interlocutory injunction to Homans as precluding any other
determination, holding that:
This Court is mindful that the decision of an appellate court on an emergency motion
for an injunction pending appeal does not constitute a binding decision that plaintiff is
entitled to permanent injunctive relief. Nonetheless, as a district court within the Tenth
Circuit, this Court is bound to follow the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the law, and
its application of the law to the facts.
Id. at 1206 (internal citations omitted).
145. Homans 11, 366 F.3d at 914 (Tymkovich, J., affirming, concurring in part and concurring
in the result). While at one point this opinion states: "the Buckley Court did not adopt a per se
rule against spending limits," the analysis nevertheless rejected, as a matter of law, the possibility
that spending limits could be sustained under the First Amendment. Id. at 915. After noting the
government interests on which the City relied to support its expenditure limits, the opinion states:
"Since all ... of the asserted interests are thus constitutionally incapable of justifying spending
restrictions as a matter of law, the court need not entertain the evidence submitted by the City."
Id.
146. The appeals court summed up this way:
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somewhat, writing that the time protection interests identified by the
City could provide a sufficient basis for the limits, 147 but he concluded
that the City's factual evidence was insufficient to support its claim. 148
3. The Eighth, First, and Sixth Circuits
Three other federal appeals courts have weighed in on this issue,
albeit without much analysis, and two have approvingly remarked that
the time protection rationale can support campaign finance reform. The
Eighth Circuit, in upholding Minnesota's voluntary spending limits,
favorably observed that the time protection rationale is "well settled"
' 149
as a compelling government interest. 150 Further, the First Circuit
upheld Rhode Island's public financing law in part because "such
programs 'facilitate communication by candidates with the electorate,'
[and] free candidates from the pressures of fundraising.'' 15 1 The Sixth
Circuit has not adopted the time protection rationale: "the need to spend
time raising money, which admittedly detracts an officeholder from
doing her job, cannot serve as a basis for limiting campaign
spending." 152  Given the lack of agreement among and within the
circuits, the compelling nature of the time protection rationale and the
We do not intend by our holding-that Albuquerque has failed in the instant case to
demonstrate a compelling state interest for its expenditure provisions-to discourage
future efforts in reforming our electoral system; we merely hold that on the record
before us, Albuquerque has failed to justify its expenditure limits.
Id.
147. Id. at 908. ("Buckley does not preclude the use of expenditure limits to further a state's
anti-corruption interest in all circumstances."). Buckley did not address the "wholly separate"
interest in preserving officeholders' time. Id. at 911. The court noted, "nothing precludes this
court from recognizing robust electoral competition as a state interest sufficiently compelling to
justify the expenditure limits." Id. at 913.
148. Id. ("Albuquerque's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the City,
fails to establish that its candidate-expenditure limits are necessary to serve a compelling state
interest.").
149. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996).
150. Id. "[T]he State seeks to promote... a diminution in the time candidates spend raising
campaign contributions, thereby increasing the time available for discussion of the issues and
campaigning." Id.
151. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)).
152. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 916-17 (6th Cir. 1998). Writing for the court,
Judge Kennedy determined that the defendants had not distinguished the expenditure limits put in
place by a local ordinance from the portion of FECA that the Supreme Court had struck down in
Buckley. Id. at 918. The City of Cincinnati had enacted its expenditure cap in order to assist
candidates who had less access to wealth, but the court determined that Buckley had already
addressed this issue, and determined that the government did not have a compelling interest in
leveling the playing field for all potential candidates. Id. at 917. But again, while it did strike
down expenditure limits, Kruse did not, however, address the specific time protection argument.
20061
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constitutionality of spending limits is a question ripe for review. 153
D. The Time Protection Rationale Provides a Compelling Government
Interest
Having now established both the possibility for review of Buckley's
mandate and the courts' need for guidance on the issue, the following
Sections delineate why time protection is a compelling government
interest that supports campaign finance reform efforts, specifically,
campaign spending limits. First, time protection safeguards the
integrity of the electoral process by allowing candidates and elected
officials to engage with voters and would-be constituents. 154 Second, it
gives elected officials back the time to do the people's business. 155
Third, time protection defends the integrity of the republican
government envisioned by the Framers and designed by the
Constitution. 156
1. The Time Protection Rationale Enhances the Electoral Process
Simply considered, the campaign is a means to an end 157-the
election of a representative in government. But the campaign is also so
much more. 158  Campaigns are conversations that educate candidates
and empower the people through political dialogue, enhancing
representative democracy. 159 Fundraising redistributes candidates' time
away from communications with everyday voters and would-be
constituents to the pursuit of contributions from the few with money
who can help fill campaign coffers. To the extent that candidates are in
153. The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Homans case, but
it is currently considering another petition for a writ of certiorari in the Landell case. Landell II,
382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
154. See infra Part m.D. 1 (discussing time protection's effect on the electoral process).
155. See infra Part IIl.D.2 (discussing time protection's effect on officials' work
performance).
156. See infra Part III.D.3 (discussing time protection's support of representative democracy).
157. In a perhaps mundane sense, campaigns are simply job interviews, a mechanism by
which we sort out those who will do the job of representing us in a legislative body, or perhaps as
the chief executive of a branch of government.
158. See William J. Gore & Robert L. Peabody, The Functions of the Political Campaign: A
Case Study, 11 W. POL. Q. 55, 55 (1958) ("Campaigns are electioneering devices, means of
getting candidates elected. But campaigns also embody traditional practices which manifest some
of our answers to the most thorny aspects of the problems of representation.").
159. There are at least four identifiable conversations within campaigns: the people educate
candidates as to their priorities; candidates educate the people as to their plans for governance; the
people educate each other in conversations about the qualifications of candidates and the
positions they hold; and candidates learn from each other and hone their positions in response to
the give-and-take of the campaign. And this does not even include the essential role of the press
in the process, which perhaps exponentially increases the array of conversations.
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touch with some people, it is often by virtue of a transactional
relationship with the wealth and the residents of what might be called
the campaign money belt.16  The resulting skew away from the people,
places, and events that would otherwise be the focus of the campaign
poses a threat to the integrity of the electoral process.
Full-throated campaigns are integral to the American constitutional
democracy and set the stage for full, active representation by
encouraging dialogue, empowering the people, and educating
candidates.161  Campaigns provide for an instrumental conversation
between candidates and voters that is central to the "uninhibited, robust
and wide-open" public debate 16 2 that in many ways defines the
republican form of government. 163  The system withers with untested
assumptions and complete agreement of thought on all issues.
164
160. See supra Part II.B (discussing the time-consuming process of fundraising).
161. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)
(stating that the Supreme Court has "recognized repeatedly that 'debate on the qualifications of
candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution.' (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). As the Buckley Court observed,
"In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will
inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15. "'[I]t can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional [First Amendment] guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."' Id. at 15 (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). Further, in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., the Court "recognized that expression on public issues 'has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."' NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Corp., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). "'[Speech]
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."' Id.
(citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
162. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
163. As Cass Sunstein has posited, "The republican commitment to universalism amounts to a
belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different conceptions of
the public good, through discussion and dialogue." Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988). See also Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of
Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56
TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989) ("Deliberative politics connotes an argumentative interchange
among persons who recognize each other as equal in authority and entitlement to respect, jointly
directed by them towards arriving at a reasonable answer to some question of public ordering...
an answer that all can accept as a good-faith determination of what is to be done when some
social choice is demanded by the circumstances.").
164. Sunstein, supra note 163, at 1576 ("Modern republicanism is thus not grounded in a
belief in homogeneity; on the contrary, heterogeneity is necessary if republican systems are to
work."). This modern analysis relates back to the Framers and, over time, the debate has
encompassed great political and legal philosophers of many generations. See, e.g., Robert J.
Lukens, Discoursing on Democracy & The Law-A Deconstructive Analysis, 70 TEMP. L. REV.
587, 612-13 (1997) ("That [scholars rely] so heavily on the notion of participation by those who
will be ruled by a particular law is by no means a new approach to discussing democracy.
Democracy is, after all, fundamentally premised on citizen participation.").
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Professor Paul Kahn has linked these ideas with the Framers' efforts:
This revolutionary moment creates the possibility of a deliberative,
constitutional politics: "I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to
putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever
quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to
your welfare by any impressions other than those which may result
from the evidence of truth." Through mutual deliberation, truth
appeals to reason, not to "ambition, avarice, personal animosity and
party opposition." Constitutional republican politics is, then, a
paradigmatic case of the link between psychological and political
order: It is a political form in which deliberation can become the basis
for effective political choice. 
165
Deliberation and democratic participation reflect the Framers' values
and maintain the fundamental promise of the republic-representation
by those who are chosen by the citizens. Campaigns are conversations
that facilitate the political selection process. While deliberation is
central, 166 a deliberative process is not a good unto itself. Rather,
through the exploration, explication, and revision of ideas in public
dialogue, ideas can be well-tested and refined in order to reach optimal
outcomes1 67 that reflect the will of the people. 168 As Professor Spencer
165. Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE
L.J. 449, 461 (1989) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton)). In this sense, the
Framers' quest "to form a more perfect Union," U.S. CONST. pmbl., depended upon the involved
citizen-participant to deliberate. This was required both for the citizens own self-fulfillment-in
order to best seek and discover truth-and for the overall good of self-government of the country.
See also Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2470, 2479 (1997) ("Democracy
not only vests the choice of government officials in the citizens, it also presupposes that the
citizens' choices will be informed. Only then are the people engaged in legitimate self-
governance.").
166. While fundraising keeps candidates from interacting with voters and hearing their views,
some also are concerned that restricting spending will restrict debate and deprive voters of needed
information about candidates. But this argument assumes that the communication in a campaign
is strictly a one-way street, with candidates disseminating their views to a passive public by
broadcasting advertisements and sending them mailings. Of course spending limits look like
restrictions on speech if that is the only vision of the function of a campaign. This Article and
this Part reject the poverty of this model and instead proceed on the basis of an optimistic belief
for an optimistic exercise-representative democracy. That optimism is sorely tested these days,
and the people are not as engaged in this conversation as would be ideal. This presents a chicken-
or-egg problem: are people apathetic because the system is not functioning well or is the system
not functioning well because the people are apathetic? As campaign costs continue to spiral,
without some intervention, the problem will only get worse. This Article is intended to show
another way.
167. Sunstein, supra note 163, at 1567 ("[M]ost of the great liberal thinkers... placed a high
premium on deliberation and discussion, and on the capacity of political dialogue to improve
outcomes and to undermine unjustified disparities in power.").
168. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
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Overton has noted, "The primary purpose of electoral competition is to
produce government officials and policy outcomes that are responsive
to the interests of citizens. '169  Similarly, through this process,
candidates can be tested to see who would be the best elected
representative.
Campaigns also provide a public forum for the people to express
views and sort priorities, fulfilling ideals of empowering the people-as-
participants. Professor Robert Bennett postulates that a democratic
conversation both informs the process and provides a sort of self-
fulfillment to the citizen. 17  As the political theorist, Professor
Benjamin Barber has argued that "talk remains central to politics, which
would ossify completely without its creativity, its variety, its openness
and flexibility, its inventiveness, its capacity for discovery, its subtlety
and complexity, its eloquence, its potential for empathy and affective
expression, and its deeply paradoxical... character that displays man's
full nature." 171 If we are to live in a political system that is entrusted to
the people, then the people must find a meaningful way to exercise this
responsibility. Without deliberation, self-government is mere
surplusage and empty words.
172
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.").
169. Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Reform, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663, 717 (2004). But Prof. Overton also notes that to the extent electoral
competition serves to protect republican government, the current declining competition hurts the
system. Id. at 716-18.
170. Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. COMM. 481,
501 (1997). "The conversational model posits that the backbone of democracy, the source of
much of the popular respect it commands, and hence of much of its strength and stability, is to be
found.., in involvement of the electorate in democratic conversation." Id. Further, "if
meaningful democratic involvement is achieved more through conversation than through voting,
we may well have a greater measure of such meaningful involvement with the two-stage ongoing
process of representative democracy than we ever might hope for with any but the most intimate
examples of direct democracy." Id. at 520.
171. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 174 (1984).
172. The Framers optimistically aspired for a well-informed citizenry as essential to the
success of the participatory political system they created-a citizenry which was to be armed with
information to discharge their solemn duties effectively. See Sunstein, supra note 163, at 1561
("Madison suggested that republican government calls for more virtue from the citizenry than
'any other form.' In this sense, the very belief in virtuous representation resulted from some
optimism about the citizenry." (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison)). As Jefferson
observed,
Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will
vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day. Although I do not... believe that the
human condition will ever advance to such a state of perfection as that there shall no
longer be pain or vice in the world, yet I believe it susceptible of much improvement,
and most of all, in matters of government and religion; and that the diffusion of
knowledge among the people is to be the instrument by which it is to be effected.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to P.S. DuPont de Nemours (Apr. 24, 1816), in THOMAS
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The campaign also is essential for educating candidates-preparing
them to most effectively represent the people. In order to function fully,
representative democracy requires that the people be able to educate and
even instruct their elected officials so that the people's will may be done
in government. 173 That time comes during the campaign. Interestingly,
Professor Cass Sunstein has written that "early Congresses rejected a
constitutional amendment that would entitle constituents to 'instruct'
their representatives about how to vote. In those debates, Madison and
others made it clear that the representatives' task called for deliberation,
and that task was inconsistent with a right to instruct.' ' 174  As the
representatives need to deliberate amongst each other, the time for
instruction from the people is the campaign.
While candidates should be engaged in these broad conversations, the
money chase robs time for fundraising. They interact with a limited set
of people in the course of campaigning, a set that is distinctly not
representative of all voters or would-be constituents. This minimizes
democratic conversation, threatens the integrity of the electoral process
and diminishes the quality of representation.
In addition to the way in which time is taken away from the
campaign debate, the campaign conversation itself is distorted because
of the demographics of the donor class. Candidates are in contact with
a disproportionate slice of the people-wealthy, and mostly out-of
district. In pursuit of money, time and attention are taken from the
many and lavished on the wealthy in the campaign money belt.
Professor Spencer Overton has offered a compelling analysis of the
demographics of fundraising, arguing that the elite nature of the donor
class ultimately undermines the democratic value of widespread
participation. 175 Plus, to the extent that wealth is concentrated in certain
areas of the country more than others, the money chase distorts the
176conversation. This concern directly implicates the time protection
rationale. Candidates and elected officials shower attention on these
unrepresentative yet influential few, to the exclusion of spending time
with the many, further threatening the integrity of the political
JEFFERSON POLITICAL WRITINGS 293 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).
173. While it is impracticable for each person to speak with their legislator at the time of each
vote, so there must come an earlier point in time to educate candidates and elected officials on the
question of how to perform their duties.
174. Sunstein, supra note 163, at 1559.
175. Overton, supra note 49.
176. As candidates chase money outside their district, instead of meeting with voters, they talk
with fundraisers concentrated in just a handful of cities. See supra notes 53-72 (describing the
money chase); supra notes 40-48 (discussing the money raised from outside one's state).
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process. 177
2. The Time Protection Rationale Lets Elected Officials Do Their Work
The time spent raising money creates a compelling problem of job
performance as elected officials who should be doing the work of the
people are not.178  As demonstrated earlier in this Article, elected
officials running for office face increasing campaign budgets and need
to spend increasing amounts of time raising money. 179 They do that at
the expense of doing the people's business. 180 In the words of Senator
Dennis DeConcini: "I felt like I was cheating, that I was not putting in a
full day's work for what I was really elected to do. I was not elected to
come back [to Washington] and raise money for my next election." 18 1
This time conflict raises compelling government interests, as every
moment spent fundraising is time taken away from representing the
people. Further, because the American Republic is founded on the
notion of elected representatives serving the people, the money chase
further undermines the system of representative democracy by
preventing full dedication to that task.
When individual representatives neglect the legislative process in
favor of fundraising, the people's right to have their chosen
representatives engaged in the legislative process is jeopardized because
those constituents are not fully represented. 182  Time stolen for
fundraising activities thus diminishes the representation provided by an
individual elected official and the overall capacity of the body to
function to its fullest.
177. As Prof. Overton writes, "[m]assive disparities in the distribution of wealth cause
disparities in political participation." Overton, supra note 49, at 77.
178. Naturally, a large percentage of candidates will be current office holders. To start, there
are incumbents seeking re-election, then there are typically other elected officials seeking to
"move up" or move over due to term limits. As one example, an analysis of the 2004 election
shows that 68 people ran for office as the Democratic or Republican nominee for 34 Senate seats.
Of that group, 47, or 69.12%, were elected officials. CQ VOTING AND ELECTIONS COLLECTIONS:
EXPERT ANALYSIS, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND DATA (2004),
http://www.cqpress.com/docs/2004Elections/2004Sen.htm. See supra Part II.B (showing that
many elected officials spend a substantial amount of time looking for campaign cash).
179. See supra Part II.A (discussing the amount of time candidates spend fundraising).
180. See supra Part ll.C (discussing the effect of campaign fundraising on incumbent job
performance).
181. SCHRAM, supra note 8, pt. I, § 3, at 40 (quoting Rep. Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ)).
"[P]eople would be genuinely unhappy about how much time members have to spend on fund-
raising. Portions of every day are spent dialing for dollars." Id. (quoting Rep. Dennis Eckert (D-
OH)).
182. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1966) (holding in a First Amendment
case that the right of constituents to be "represented in governmental debates by the person they
have elected to represent them" is an interest of the highest magnitude).
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In addition to this common sense notion of conflict, the Constitution
speaks to this problem, as it directly protects the core functions of
legislators in the Speech or Debate Clause. 183  The text provides
protection for Members of Congress as they carry out their essential
functions as legislators, such as debating, voting, and attending
committee meetings and hearings. 184  The excessive demands of
fundraising take away the time of officeholders to perform these
protected acts, undermining the integrity of the offices they hold. While
the Clause was not included specifically in response to the time
protection concern of modem-day campaigns, it further enforces our
understanding of why it is compelling to protect the time of our elected
representatives. 1
85
The Supreme Court held in Powell v. McCormack that the purpose of
the Speech or Debate Clause is "to insure that legislators are not
distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks
by being called into court to defend their actions." 186  The Speech orDebate Clause has a broad mandate and is to "be read broadly to
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
184. It reads "The Senators and Representatives shall ... be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
185. The Clause was drafted into the Constitution to protect elected representatives.
"In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public
trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every
one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence."
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (quoting James Wilson ii, WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON (Andrews ed., 1936)). Freedom for elected officials to fully debate was an essential
necessity in the formation of the Constitution.
Freedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a matter of course by
those who severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation. It was
deemed so essential for representatives of the people that it was written into the
Articles of Confederation and later into the Constitution.
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372. The Speech or Debate Clause is so important, in fact, that its
protections have been extended to both State and local governments. See id. (extending Speech
and Debate Clause to state government).
Because the common law accorded local legislators the same absolute immunity it
accorded legislators at other levels of government, and because the rationales for such
immunity are fully applicable to local legislators, we now hold that local legislators are
likewise absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for their legislative activities.
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44,49 (1998).
186. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969). Additionally, the Court held in United
States v. Johnson that "[t]he legislative privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an
unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the 'practical
security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169, 179 (1966). The term "practical security" came from THE FEDERALIST, NO. 41 (James
Madison), in discussing the reasons for drafting the Speech or Debate Clause.
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effectuate its purposes[.]" 1 87 While the text uses the terms "speech" and
"debate," it protects more than just these two acts. 188 In that spirit, the
Speech or Debate Clause has been held to protect many specific acts of
legislative business. 189  Thus the Clause protects literal speech and
debate, plus other specific acts essential to the legislative process.
While it protects many activities, there are limits on the Speech or
Debate Clause. 19 Many acts taken in an official capacity, "includ[ing]
providing constituent services, aiding individuals seeking government
contracts and arranging appointments with government agencies, as
well as communicating directly with the public through [various]
media... [and] speeches delivered outside of Congress,,' 19 1 are not
specifically protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. This distinction
further emphasizes the notion that legislators in a republican
government must be free to fulfill their public duties.
At its core, the Speech or Debate Clause ensures that Members of
Congress are able to do their jobs. "Distracting or deterring even a few
individual members of a collective legislative body can, of course,
undermine the capacity of the body as a whole to do its lawmaking
work .... ,,19 2  This is exactly the problem caused when fundraising
187. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) and
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)). See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616
(1972) (holding that the Speech or Debate Clause is designed to assure the Congress "wide
freedom of speech, debate and deliberation"); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 ("Legislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private
indulgence but for the public good.").
188. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 ("It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to
limit it to words spoken in debate.").
189. Id.
The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that
body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be
reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is done vocally or by passing
between the tellers. In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one
of its members in relation to the business before it.
Id.
190. As the Court explained, the Speech or Debate Clause "has not been extended beyond the
legislative sphere." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972). The Court continued:
That Senators generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators does
not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members of Congress are
constantly in touch with the Executive Branch of the Government and with
administrative agencies-they may cajole, and exhort with respect to administration of
a federal statute-but such conduct, though generally done, is not protected legislative
activity.
Id. at 625.
191. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOL. 1 § 5-20, at 1016 (3d ed.
2000).
192. Id. at 1014.
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takes officeholders away from doing their jobs-the people's work. 193
The government has a compelling interest in protecting the time of
elected officials who are increasingly compelled to spend large amounts
of time fundraising instead of legislating, debating, and meeting with
constituents.
3. The Time Protection Rationale Supports Representative Democracy
The excessive demands of fundraising erode the quality of
representation provided and the time protection rationale speaks to this
compelling interest. First, as just discussed, republican government is
threatened by the fact that the people's representatives are not able
spend enough time doing their jobs to represent the people. But there is
more to it than that. The money chase, and the time it takes from
candidates and elected officials, poses a potential threat to
representative democracy. 194 As time is taken away from effective and
responsive job performance, representative democracy is diminished.
The actual time lost is just the beginning. The danger to
representative democracy is layered, and various sources help us
understand the nature of the threat. The Constitution and the basic
structure of government reflect the Framers' deep concerns about the
quality of representation. As a baseline, Federalist 39 "define[s] a
republic to be... a government which derives all its powers directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by
persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or
during good behavior." 195 As time is taken from the many and given to
the few-those with money and access to individuals who have and
contribute money-the power is drawn away from the great body of
people and redistributed to the select few. The resulting departure away
from the "true north" of representative government is a compelling
concern.
The philosophy of representative democracy has been enshrined in
the Constitution and preserving this essential core of government is of
193. See supra Part II.C (discussing time conflicts with job performance caused by campaign
fundraising).
194. HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL
REFORM 51 (1992). "And incumbents spend more and more time raising money, taking time
away from their duties as elected officials." Id.
195. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). The terms representative democracy will be
used interchangeably with republic. Madison also wrote: "The principle of self-government
embodies, among other things, the precept that the people, the true sovereigns, are more to be
trusted than their delegates, those who hold elective office." See James Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
VOL. II, at 185 (Gallard Hunt ed., 1901).
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the utmost importance. Members of Congress reflect representative
democracy in action. 196  The people retain power by selecting their
representatives to the national government. The Constitution makes a
significant statement of commitment to protect this form of government
in the States: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government....,,197 The Guarantee
Clause reflects a solemn obligation to the principles of representative
democracy. 198  In addition, as the people exercise their power through
their elected representatives, voting is the key mechanism by which they
exercise their dominion and power over the government. That essential
tool of democracy is protected throughout the Constitution. 19 Further,
Supreme Court case law has stressed the importance of protecting the
mechanisms and principles of representative democracy. 200  In these
myriad ways, the American Republic is committed to a political system
where the people are kept in power, and elected officials specifically
exercise that power.
Under the current system, there is a trade-off of time and a distortion
of the way time is spent, away from the elected officials' constituents.
Not only is time taken away from campaigning and official duties, but
those who contribute do not represent a typical slice of any elected
official's district.2° 1 Fundraising specifically requires candidates to call
196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States .... ); U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof .... ) (emphasis added).
197. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
198. See also Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and a New
Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2003) (arguing that campaign finance reform could be
justified by reference to the Guarantee Clause).
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (protecting the vote for emancipated slaves); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (protecting the vote for women); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (abolishing the poll
tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (extending right to vote to eighteen-year-olds).
200. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 738-39
(1964) (applying Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence establishing the one-person, one-vote
principle to Colorado Legislative apportionment); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 655 (1964)
(declaring unconstitutional apportionment not substantially based on population); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (holding that apportionment of seats in two houses invalid
because it was not based on population and lacked rationality); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
20 (1964) (holding unconstitutional apportionment of congressional districts making single
congressmen represent two or three times more voters than other districts); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (declaring unconstitutional statewide system of weighing rural votes more
heavily than urban votes). See also, e.g., Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns and
Modem Vote Dilution, 23 LAW & INEQ. 239 (2005) (arguing that dilution of power today due to
the role of money in campaigns can be analogized to dilution of power rejected in the one-person,
one-vote case law).
201. See supra Part II.B (discussing the campaign money chase).
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on a select group of individuals with money and/or access thereto, who
are spread out at certain money hotspots around the country. 20 2 To the
extent that candidates and elected officials spend their time with these
people, they are not able to learn what their constituents most want, and
conversely, they are not able to educate their constituents about what is
happening in the legislative arena.20 3 Elected officials serve their own
personal goals of re-election at the expense of the time needed to serve
the public good. As Professor Vince Blasi has argued,
An electoral system that leads most incumbents and challengers to
spend large amounts of their time courting donors violates a norm that
is important across a broad spectrum of theories of representation: that
representatives must have the opportunity and the incentive to serve
well the political objectives of the persons they represent, not just their
own political objective of getting elected.204
The time focused on a select few people threatens the ultimate quality
of representation provided to the many.
Candidates freed of the need to raise so much money ultimately can
be more involved with the people, and broad participation can enhance
the quality of representation. 20 5  Widespread participation in
government and the political process exposes decision-makers to a
broad array of ideas and perspectives and increases the peoples'
participation and buy-in into government. 20 6  In this way time
protection also serves First Amendment values. With less time devoted
to fundraising, candidates and elected officials can spend more time
207
engaged in core political speech. While there are many debates over
what the First Amendment does protect, "there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs." 20 8 Discussion of public issues
is integral to the American constitutional system. The First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order to
protect "uninhibited, robust and wide-open' 20 9 public debate and the
202. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing travel demands of the money chase).
203. See supra Part II.C (discussing the issues with job performance as a result of campaign
finance demands).
204. Blasi, supra note 3, at 1305.
205. Spencer Overton persuasively argues that widespread participation is one of the key
underlying democratic values that must inform our analysis of campaign finance reform. "[T]he
Justices aim to promote four democratic values: democratic deliberation, widespread
participation, individual autonomy, and electoral competition." Overton, supra note 169, at 668.
206. See id. (describing the importance of widespread participation).
207. See supra Part II.B (describing the impact of campaign fundraising on elected officials).
208. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
209. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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"unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."2  Focusing on time protection
can reinvigorate the public discourse on public affairs, further
strengthening American representative democracy.2 11
IV. WHAT FOLLOWS? ALTERNATIVES IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
As demonstrated above, the time protection rationale provides a
compelling government interest sufficient to justify some form of
campaign finance regulation, but the question remains as to how best to
reduce the amount of time needed to raise the money spent on a
campaign. On the revenue side, we can consider ways to raise the
money more quickly in order to meet the ever-increasing costs. On the
expense side, we can consider ways to reduce the costs in order to
match current revenue. Accordingly, several possibilities emerge: (1)
completely eliminate contribution caps; (2) provide public financing for
campaigns; and (3) limit campaign expenditures. 2 12 This Part explores
each of those possibilities and ultimately demonstrates that limiting
campaign spending is the most narrowly tailored means available 213 to
serve the compelling government interest in protecting the time of
candidates and elected officials.
2 14
A. Eliminating Contribution Limits: Recipe for Disaster
One simple response to the concern that candidates spend more and
more time in pursuit of money would be to let anyone give any amount
desired. Instead of wasting time seeking money at a maximum of
$2,000 per person, the idea would be for candidates to ask just a handful
210. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
211. See also Blasi, supra note 3, at 1305 ("The availability of a coherent norm, derived from
the constitutional concern for the quality of representation, makes the candidate-time-protection
rationale for spending limits less problematic than the quality-of-public-debate rationale that was
ruled illegitimate in Buckley.").
212. The purpose is not to explore the infinite range of campaign reform proposals available,
but this review of these three approaches best provides a broad framework for considering the
practical ramifications of finding time protection to be a compelling government interest. Also
note that term limits will not be considered, because they only prevent one specific individual
from campaigning for one specific office at one specific point in time. Still, others will run for
that office, and that office holder will likely run for a different one. Accordingly, term limits do
nothing systemically to address the underlying concern of protecting the time of candidates and
officeholders.
213. See supra note 90 (describing the application of strict scrutiny).
214. This Part illustrates yet another way in which this article further develops this idea, in a
way that is distinct from Prof. Blasi's work. This article more particularly explores the
ramifications of the courts holding that time protection is a compelling government interest, in a
manner that is fully different from Prof. Blasi's article.
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of individuals for million dollar checks. This is likely a fairly direct
way to get at the problem of reducing time spent raising money, but its
flaws make it the least appropriate alternative.
Buckley and history tell us that we would have significant worries
about money and corruption under this alternative. 215 There is constant
proof that money can have a corrupting influence on the system.
2 16
Contributors seek access, power and influence, and they get it.
217
During campaigns, contributors receive special attention from
candidates, and during the legislative process, the successful candidates
they support treat their contributors favorably. 2 18  Campaign money is
potent and has the power to shape results. Several studies have
215. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (addressing the FECA amendments
passed in the wake of Watergate).
216. See, e.g., Albert Salvato, Ohio Governor Fined Over Unreported Gifts, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2005, at A12 (reporting on Ohio Gov. Bob Taft pleading guilty of ethic violations
involving unreported gifts); John P. Martin, First guilty plea in Monmouth bribe cases, THE
STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 25, 2005, at 17 (reporting on first conviction among group of eleven local
New Jersey officials caught in major corruption case).
217. As Charles Keating said, "One question.., had to do with whether my financial support
in any way influenced several political figures to take up my cause. I want to say in the most
forceful way I can: I certainly hope so." Michael Kranish, 5 Senators Who Aided S&L Face
Query in Gifts, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1989, at 1.
218. The McConnell litigation carefully detailed these concerns, specifically in the context of
large contributions to political parties. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, on the three-judge District Court
panel wrote:
The record demonstrates that large donations ... to the political parties provide donors
with access to Members of Congress. The record is a treasure trove of testimony from
Members of Congress, individual and corporate donors, and lobbyists, as well as
documentary evidence, establishing that contributions... are given with the
expectation they will provide the donor with access to influence federal officials, that
this expectation is fostered by the national parties, and that this expectation is often
realized.
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 492 (D. D.C. 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part, 540
U.S. 93 (2003).
219. There always will be a debate as to "whether contributions follow positions or positions
follow contributions." Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes?
Evidence from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J. L. & ECON. 345, 349 (2002) [hereinafter
Stratmann, Financial Services]. See Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo, Timothy Groseclose, Corporate
PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 BUS. AND POLITICS 75, 85 (2000)
(acknowledging the correlation between money and votes and equating it with bribery, but
challenging the efficacy of corporate political contributions); Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de
Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political
Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money In Politics?" (Oct.
2002), available at http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/2002/LittleMoney-Politics.pdf (arguing that
campaign contributions are not a wise investment; rather they are a form of political
participation). Compare Gary C. Durden & Jonathan I. Silberman, Determining Legislative
Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J. POL. EcON. 317, 328 (1976)
(suggesting a strong correlation between contributions and voting patterns), with Henry W.
Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit
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documented the effect of money on the system and shown how money
can buy votes 22  and change legislative outcomes. 22 1  Despite best
intentions, political actors are not angels, 222 and there is sufficient
reason to be concerned that lifting caps on contributions would have a
corrupting influence on the system.
Buckley wisely held that preventing corruption or the appearance
thereof was a compelling overnment interest sufficient to justify
campaign finance reform. 2  It is no accident that the standard has
withstood the test of time.2 24  Despite the ongoing criticisms of the
Buckley decision, 22 5 there is near universal agreement that preventing
corruption or the appearance thereof is a compelling government
Model, R. ECON. AND STAT. 77, 83 (taking the opposite position and specifically refuting Durden
and Silberman). For further exploration of this topic, see Alexander, supra, note 200, at 251-55.
220. See Stratmann, Financial Services, supra note 219, at 368 (cross-referencing votes on
financial services legislation against contribution patterns by PACs and interest groups from
1991-1998, concluding "interest groups 'buy' legislators' votes with PAC contributions").
Another study examining agriculture-related votes reached similar conclusions. Thomas
Stratmann, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of
Contributions Matter?, 77 R. ECON AND STAT. 127, 129, 135 (1995) [hereinafter Stratmann,
Timing] ("The results confirm the qualitative and quantitative importance of campaign
contributions."). See also Durden & Silberman, supra note 219, at 317 (suggesting a strong
correlation between contributions and voting patterns).
221. Stratmann, Timing, supra note 220, at 127 ("Without campaign contributions farm
interest would have lost in five of the seven votes that were won."). See also Christopher Magee,
Campaign Contributions, Policy Decisions, and Election Outcomes: A Study of the Effects of
Campaign Finance Reform, 64 JEROME LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD C. PUB. POL. BRIEF 5, 37
(2001) (stating that in terms of "House support for NAFTA, cuts in defense spending, and gun
control ... PAC money appeared to be decisive on these issues.").
222.
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
223. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions-in
order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $ 1,000 contribution
limitation.... To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined.
Id. at 26-27.
224. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136, 152-53 (2003) (rejecting dissenting
Justice Kennedy's "crabbed view of corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corruption,
[which] ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising exposed by
the record in this litigation").
225. For a discussion of this discontent, see for example, Alexander, supra note 198; text
accompanying notes 196-202.
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interest that justifies restrictions on campaign finance reforms. 2 26  As
the Supreme Court observed in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, "there is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions
will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to
question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters."
227
Completely uncapping contributions would fly in the face of that long-
established case law and its compelling logic.
Further, removing contribution limits could result in a massive
escalation in overall fundraising and campaign spending, posing
additional problems. To the extent that candidates currently shower
their attention on the few with money and access thereto, that would
likely increase. The wealthiest of the wealthy political contributors
would be bombarded by solicitations for funds in amounts exponentially
greater than the current caps allow. If one candidate could quickly raise
tens of millions of dollars, her opponent might be hard-pressed to do so
without dramatically increasing the time spent doing so. Thus, the time
drain could become even worse on one side of the election. 22 8  In
addition, the debate itself could be greatly skewed because those with
money would be even more likely to determine the winners. Some
candidates could remain in a race, entirely based on the support of a
very small number of rich friends. But this would impoverish the
overall debate that is essential to the integrity of the electoral process.
229
Proponents of deregulation 230  often argue that all money in
campaigns is a form of political expression23 1 and reject any reform
proposals by saying that there should be no regulation of what they
deem core political speech.232 As Justice Thomas forcefully dissented
226. Although proving such is another matter that raises questions about the overall footing of
the corruption rationale. See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L REV.
119, 120 (2004) (discussing public perception of corruption and the link to problems in the
campaign finance system).
227. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000).
228. This is a variant on the public financing problem discussed above. See infra Part IV.B
(describing how public financing does not serve the time protection rationale as effectively as
expenditure limits).
229. See supra Part II.B (discussing the compelling need to protect the electoral process).
230. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable
Dilemmas, 94 COLUM L. REV. 1258, 1269 (1994) (discussing methods to prevent corruption);
Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance
Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1996) (discussing flaws in campaign reform efforts).
231. Limits on raising or spending money "operate in an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
232. While the First Amendment makes a clear command that "Congress shall make no
law..." it is certainly not absolute, as there are regulations on all types of speech. U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
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in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee:
I continue to believe that [Buckley] should be overruled. "Political
speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection," and it is
the lifeblood of a self-governing people. I remain baffled that this
Court has extended the most generous First Amendment safeguards to
filing lawsuits, wearing profane jackets, and exhibiting drive-in
movies with nudity, but has offered only tepid protection to the core
speech and associational rights that our Founders sought to defend.
233
This position, however, is unsound. First, while Buckley equated
money and speech, that underlying premise is flawed. After all, as
Justice Stevens wrote, "[m]oney is property; it is not speech. ' 23 4
Further, while money can help effectuate speech, as it is used to pay for
a great many communicative tools in a campaign, it should not be
confused with core political speech. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg have
disputed the money-equals-speech premise, arguing that money is not
speech, but rather enables it. 2 5 Likewise, the position has been coming
under greater attack from scholars as well.236
But even without challenging the central premise of money-as-
speech, the deregulation proponents' position is ultimately unhelpful. A
state should not be forced to abandon one set of compelling interests in
order to pursue another if there is a way to reconcile them. As
discussed below, 237 by limiting both contributions and expenditures, the
state can bring the equation back into balance and reduce the amount of
time spent raising money. The state can protect the integrity of the
electoral system with expenditure limits, but solely eliminating
contribution caps creates no guarantee that spending would be
manageable and that the attendant fundraising would take less of the
limited time of candidates and officeholders. Instead we would face the
233. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465-66 (2001)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In Homans II, the Tenth Circuit accepted this
approach, as it rejected the time protection argument. Homans 11, 366 F.3d 900, 913 (10th Cir.
2004).
234. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
also Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Political
Money, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1235, 1241 (2000) (building on Stevens's dissent to "contend[] that
courts should consider both speech doctrine and property doctrine in developing a new way to
look at campaign finance").
235. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg joined
this opinion.
236. See, e.g., Eric L. Richards, The Emergence of Covert Speech and its Implications for
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 559 (2001) (examining the negative effects of
money on the political process and equating money with power, not speech).
237. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the interests served by placing spending limits on
political campaigns).
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widespread corruption that has haunted the system since Mark Hanna
introduced big-time fundraising to American politics in 1896.238
B. Public Financing: Paper Tiger
At first blush, public financing could serve the goal of reducing the
time spent raising money, but upon further exploration it does not serve
the time protection rationale as effectively as expenditure limits. Public
financing generally refers to voluntary public financing systems-those
in which a candidate receives public funding if she chooses to abide by
a spending cap. 23 9  In a nutshell, the idea is that instead of making
political campaigns privately funded affairs, let the money come from
government. With government funding, there would be little or no need
at all for private money, and therefore little or no need for private
fundraising. In that sense, public financing can be seen as a well-
crafted, constitutionally sound response to the time protection
concern. 24  But as candidates want more and more money to run their
campaigns, under the current state of the law, voluntary public
financing cannot combat the runaway spending, and candidates will
constantly opt out. Thus, this option does not satisfactorily address the
time protection problem.
While the jurisdictions that have enacted public financing have
demonstrated a commitment to ending the money chase (perhaps
because of time protection concerns), under the current legal regime, all
238. See, e.g., Bill Bradley, TIME PRESENT, TIME PAST 162-166 (1997) (discussing Hanna
and his role in the presidential election of 1896). Interestingly, the official White House
presidential biography page for President McKinley puts Hanna's involvement in the race in the
first sentence, before even mentioning McKinley's name. See The White House: William
McKinley, http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/wm25.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
239. "Fourteen states provide direct public financing to candidates. An additional ten states
provide minimal public financing to candidates and/or political parties, generally funded through
taxpayer contributions to political parties through their tax returns." Common Cause, Public
Financing in the States, http://www.commoncause.org (follow "Public Financing" under "Money
in Politics" hyperlink; then select "Overview and Links to Public Finance Laws in the States")
(last visited Feb. 16, 2006). See, e.g., HAW. CONST., art. II § 5; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-
208-209 (LexisNexis 2003); Maine Clean Election Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1015
(2003), upheld in Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445, 472 (1st Cir. 2000); MINN. STAT. §10A.25 (2003), upheld in Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101
F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 17-25-1, 17-25-30.1 (2004), upheld in Vote
Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1993); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:25-6.1-6.10,
-12.1-12.11, -15.1-15.66, -16.1-16.9 (2004). Numerous municipalities have enacted public
financing for their campaigns. See National Civic League, Local Campaign Finance Reform
(2002), http://www.ncl.org/npplcfr/inventory.html (listing cities with public financing).
240. Buckley and the subsequent case of Republican National Committee v. FEC upheld the
system of public financing for the U.S. presidential campaigns. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC,
487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y 1980), affd mei., 445 U.S. 955 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 91 (1976).
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public financing is optional.24 1  The government cannot require
candidates to spend only the amount provided for via public funds,
dramatically reducing the effectiveness of the program. At its core, that
candidates cannot be forced to opt in makes public financing less
narrowly tailored to serve the time protection rationale.
The relevant case law illuminates. To start, Buckley both approved
public financing and, with its cramped perspective equating money and
speech, held that mandatory spending limits would be
242unconsitutional. In a subsequent action upholding the presidential
election funding law, a lower court held, "as long as the candidate
remains free to engage in unlimited private funding and spending
instead of limited public funding, the law does not violate the First
Amendment rights of the candidate or supporters." 243  While the state
may fund political campaigns and condition acceptance of public funds
on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations,2 44 it may not compel compliance with such laws. The First
Circuit confronted this question in Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano,245
when it upheld Rhode Island's voluntary public financing scheme. The
law had been challenged, inter alia, on the grounds that certain
incentives made the public funding voluntary in name but mandatory in
effect. While rejecting the factual premise, the court did agree with the
legal argument: "voluntariness has proven to be an important factor in
judicial ratification of government-sponsored campaign financing
schemes. Coerced compliance.., would raise serious, perhaps fatal,
objections .. . ." 246 The inability to force compliance is the gaping hole
241. Supra note 239.
242. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57-58. Further, the presidential election funding law, with only
voluntary compliance, was upheld in Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 283-86
(S.D.N.Y.). "Federal law ... provided $ 20,000,000 in public funding to presidential candidates
who agreed to limit campaign expenditures to that amount. The court held that this scheme did
not burden a candidate's First Amendment rights because it simply provided an additional option
for accumulating campaign funds." Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549.
243. Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F.Supp. at 284.
244. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57. As the First Circuit wrote in Rosenstiel, "The Supreme Court
held that while the imposition of a mandatory limit on campaign expenditures violated a
candidate's First Amendment rights, a voluntary system under which candidates agreed to limit
campaign expenditures in exchange for public financing of their campaigns was constitutionally
permissible." Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549.
245. Vote Choice Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 43 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Daggett v.
Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 466-67 (1st Cir. 2000)
(upholding Maine's public financing and specifically holding that there was no unconstitutional
coercion). Cf N.H. Right to Life PAC v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 19-20 (lst Cir. 1996) (invalidating
law which limited independent expenditures to $1000 per election as a violation of the First
Amendment).
246. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38-39 (citations omitted).
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in the efficacy of public financing. 24 7
Two current examples, from New York City and New Jersey,
illustrate. New York has what many consider to be one of the most
progressive public financing schemes in the nation.248  In the 2005
campaign for mayor, the incumbent, Michael Bloomberg-a billionaire
who spent around $75 million in winning the job four years ago249_
spent $84 million in successful pursuit of reelection.250 He outspent his
Democratic opponent, Fernando Ferrer, by an approximate 9-1 ratio;
Bloomberg raised $5.3 million and received an additional $3.9 million
in public funding.251  In New Jersey, there is public financing for
gubernatorial elections, but both major party candidates for governor
largely self-funded in the 2005 election.2 32 Then-Senator Jon Corzine,
the Democratic gubernatorial nominee, spent over $63 million to win
his Senate seat in 2000, $60 million of which came from his own
pocket.253  The Republican nominee, Doug Forrester, is also a multi-
millionaire who many Republicans supported as a candidate because of
his financial status, believing that he could provide enough of his own
247. This also suggests another policy option not specifically explored in these pages: public
financing combined with mandatory spending limits. Such a scheme might prove to be an
effective way to deal with the time protection concern. To the extent that voluntary public
financing is ineffective, this highlights the importance of mandatory spending limits, supported
by the time protection rationale.
248. See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, chs. 46 & 49 §1136.1 (2004) available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/citycharter2004.pdf (detailing limitations on
campaigns in New York City); see also New York City Campaign Finance Board: Overview,
http://www.nyccfb.info/programjlaw/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (providing an
overview by The New York City Campaign Finance Board, the city agency which administers the
program.); Tova Andrea Wang, The Century Foundation, New York City's Campaign Finance
Solution, Nov. 17, 2003, http://www.reformelections.org (follow "2003-2004" under "News &
Opinion" hyperlink) (discussing New York City's plan as "a testing ground in this area").
249. See Michael Cooper, Mayoral Flaws (and Chances), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at B3
(discussing the recent approval ratings "slip" of Mayor Bloomberg and his pledge to spend in
excess of the record $75 million spent on the 2001 campaign); Jim Rutenberg, Spending More,
Mayor Refines Vote Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at Al (discussing how Blooomberg, the
Republican mayoral candidate, spent more than three times that of his Democrat rivals in the
2005 race and spent a record $74 million in his successful 2001 campaign for mayor).
250. New York City Campaign Finance Board, Campaign Finance Summary 2005,
http://www.nyccfb.info/publicdisclosure/summ_05.htm. Mayor Bloomberg had said publicly,
perhaps strategically, that he does not intend to spend $75 million for his reelection. Mike
McIntire, Race Shouldn't Cost $75 Million Again, Mayor Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at
B8.
251. New York City Campaign Finance Board, supra note 250.
252. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:25-15.1-15.66, -16.1-16.49 (2004).
253. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, CONGRESSIONAL RACES,
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.asp-(select "New Jersey"; select "2000" election
cycle; follow "Senate" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (listing amounts raised by the
various candidates for the 2000 New Jersey Senate race).
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funds to mount a successful campaign. 254 With these two individuals in
the race, spending skyrocketed to a total of around $75 million.255  In
both situations, multimillionaires drove the need for more and more
money.
Multimillionaire candidates and those with prodigious fundraising
machines assume they should opt out of public funding plans that will
not match what private funds or fundraising will generate. 25 6 Whether
by tapping into personal wealth or into a powerful fundraising machine,
the prevailing sentiment seems to be, as long as you have the capability,
spend more. Why? Because of the conventional wisdom that money
buys success in elections: year after year, in around 90-95 percent of
elections, the candidate who raises and spends the most money wins. 257
With this trend, it is no wonder that campaign spending has continued to
increase far faster than inflation, 25 8 and no end is in sight. Accordingly,
all candidates must come to the table ready to raise and spend untold
millions.25
9
Without mandatory limits on publicly financed elections, all
candidates remain free to spend unlimited amounts if they do not accept
254. David Kocieniewski, Law May Bar Forrester Funds in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2005, at B6. ("When Douglas R. Forrester made his improbable rise to the top of New Jersey's
Republican Party three years ago, his ascent was fueled largely by his wealth and willingness to
spend millions of dollars on political campaigns."); Tom Turcol & Cynthia Burton, Forrester
Campaign Could Lose His Own Millions, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 7, 2005, at B 1. ("Forrester
promoted his candidacy to key Republicans partly on his assertion that the party needed a
wealthy, self-financed candidate such as him to compete with the wealthy Corzine, who also is
financing his campaign.").
255. Corzine apparently spent "about $45 million" while Forrester spent $30 million. Charlie
Cook, Forecast For GOP Looks Anything But Sunny, NAT'L J., Nov. 12, 2005. See also Winners
And Losers Nov. 6-12, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, at D2 (reporting on the outcome of several
elections). In 2002, 43 percent of newly elected Members of Congress were millionaires, as
compared to only 1 percent of the U.S. population. Jonathan D. Salant, Nearly Half of
Congressional Freshmen Are Millionaires, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 25, 2002.
256. For example, in the 2004 presidential primaries, President Bush, Senator Kerry, and
Governor Dean all eschewed public financing because they could raise far more privately than the
amount available through public financing. See, e.g., CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 2004
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/index.asp (listing the sources
of campaign financing for the 2004 presidential election).
257. See, e.g., U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2002
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2003), available at
http://www.pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=10366 ("Ninety-four percent of the
candidates who raised the most hard money won their 2002 general elections.... General
election winners out-raised losers by approximately 4-to-1 .").
258. See supra Part II.A (documenting spiraling campaign costs).
259. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273, 320-24 (1993). In fact, without knowing who one's opponent will
be, the would-be candidate has to start with the assumption that a massive war chest will be
necessary to combat either type of opponent.
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the public financing, as seen in New York City and New Jersey.
Ultimately, if a state interest is truly compelling, there is something
illogical about saying the state must rely on voluntary compliance to
pursue it.260 The compelling government interest in candidate time
protection will be not be served by optional public financing laws.
C. Spending Limits: The Most Narrowly Tailored Alternative
This article proposes that the most effective way to protect the time
of candidates and officeholders is to impose limits on campaign
expenditures. 261  Spending drives the need to raise money; as long as
spending continues to escalate, the money chase will spiral and time
will be lost. Capping the amount that any candidate can spend will
correspondingly limit the amount of time spent raising money, thereby
serving the compelling government interest identified earlier.
262
In considering the constitutionality of expenditure limits, first recall
that there is a significant question among the Justices as to the future of
Buckley. 263 Justice Kennedy's words in particular merit review: "For
now, however, I would leave open the possibility that Congress, or a
260. Public financing also provides an unfortunate reality check: governments may not
provide the kind of money necessary to fully fund their elections. Public financing is inadequate
and provides a less narrowly tailored alternative because it may not be financially feasible for
jurisdictions to provide the levels of public financing that would assure a sufficiently high rate of
participation. To optimize voluntary participation, a jurisdiction may need to provide matching
funds equal to what a non-participating opponent is spending (or close to it), and governments are
not likely to put up the required money. Recall that President Bush, Senator Kerry, and Governor
Dean all opted out of the public financing of the 2004 presidential primaries. Supra note 256. To
the extent that a narrow tailoring analysis is required, we must consider what that means in this
context. To be effective, a less restrictive alternative must be both plausible and feasible. See,
e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (affirming the district court's decision to
enjoin enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act because of the likelihood of less restrictive
alternatives); United States v. Playboy Enter. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815-16 (2000) (discussing the
standards for restrictions on access to indecent material). But a voluntary system of public
financing inherently is ineffective, since any one candidate who chooses to opt out can effectively
eviscerate the limits, decline public funding and spend unrestricted amounts, and because the
amounts provided may be inadequate to the task.
261. See also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of
the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1729, 1769-70 (2001).
Expenditure limitations could also reduce the burdens and distractions of fundraising.
Instead of devoting critical campaign time and effort to raising funds, candidates could
spend more time on debates, campaigning, and meeting with the voters. This could
improve the quality of campaigns, increase voter information, and, ultimately, enhance
citizen participation and election day turnout.
Id.
262. This more forcefully advances Blasi's claim: "campaign spending limits justified by the
objective of candidate time protection should not be presumed to be unconstitutional." Blasi,
supra note 3, at 1324.
263. See supra Part II.B (addressing compelling government interest post-Buckley).
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state legislature, might devise a system in which there are some limits
on both expenditures and contributions, thus permitting officeholders to
concentrate their time and efforts on official duties rather than on
fundraising." 264  Spending limits tailored to time protection concerns
respond to Justice Kennedy's call. Innovative change is possible, even
without overturning the prevailing framework: this proposal responds to
and works within the Buckley framework. While Buckley dictates that
strict scrutiny must be employed,2 65 such scrutiny need not be-and in
266this context is not always-fatal. Nothing in Buckley imposes an
absolute ban on campaign spending limits.
267
Freeing candidates' time will open up campaigns, free time for the
people's work to be done and improve representative democracy
overall. As Professor Blasi has written, "[s]pending limits address a
problem that is central to the system of representation ordained by the
Constitution." 268  Allowing candidates to spend less time fundraising
will permit them to engage with the people in other ways of their
choosing. 26 9  Freeing the time of incumbent officeholders will allow
them to speak, debate, legislate and govern.270 The overall impact will
help improve the functioning of representative democracy.
271
The time protection rationale not only serves the compelling
government interest of time protection within the Buckley First
Amendment framework, it affirmatively promotes speech interests.
Moving candidates and officeholders away from limited conversations
with the select few, to a broader conversation with all, enhances
political speech at its broadest and finest. The time not spent
fundraising can be used to engage in a wide variety of activities,
264. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
265. As a separate matter, the Court should at some point consider whether strict scrutiny is
required when courts review campaign finance reform measures, or perhaps a lesser level of
scrutiny is appropriate. Irrespective of the level of scrutiny required, the time protection rationale
presents a compelling government interest.
266. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 653 (1990) (applying
strict scrutiny and upholding restrictions on corporate expenditures in political campaigns);
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny and upholding ban on
certain electioneering activities near polling places). See also supra note 90 (discussing "strict-
in-theory, fatal-in-fact" cases).
267. See supra note 93, for a discussion of why Buckley does not impose a per se ban on
expenditure limits.
268. Blasi, supra note 3, at 1324.
269. See supra Part IIl.B (considering post-Buckley possibilities for a compelling government
interest).
270. See supra Part III.C (describing the circuit split over the protection rationale).
271. See supra Part II.D (outlining how time protection is a compelling government interest).
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including core political speech.2 72  The "time freed from fund-raising
creates new opportunities for speech.... To the degree that spending
limits restore voter confidence in the quality of representation, the gain
in citizen engagement can be computed in First Amendment terms." 273
Preserving the time of candidates thus furthers free speech.
Campaign expenditure limits maintain respect for the First
Amendment value of campaign contributions. The Buckley Court held
that "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views[.]" 274  To the extent that there is some
communicative aspect of campaign contributions, campaign expenditure
limits still allow such expression. Similarly, political contributions have
an associational value. "Making a contribution, like joining a political
party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. In addition, it enables
like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common
political goals." 275  To the extent that political contributions involve
precious speech and associational rights, expenditure limits respect
those rights.
Further, it is so important to keep public officials in touch with their
constituents, and fundraising can be a part of that-it is one way in
which the people communicate with candidates and elected officials.
As one Senator said,
"I felt that for all of us who were senators, and who were being treated
as minor nobility, that the fact that we had to go ask people for money
was very healthy. And that it gave you at least a slight degree of
humility.... I think you should have to ask people to support you, and
you should have to ask them to do so tangibly."
While there is an element of truth, this comment does not reconcile
272. While the money chase occupies too much time, it is not inherently evil. While
fundraising is time consuming, the point of this Article is not to propose that campaigns must be
balanced toward only "good" versus "bad" activities. The problem is that, by spending so much
time in pursuit of money, the system suffers. By giving time back to candidates and elected
officials, we give them the chance to do with it what they see fit. Republican democracy allows
those choices but without reform, more and more time will be lost to fundraising.
273. Blasi, supra note 3, at 1324. Blasi continues, "[w]hen the conventional reluctance to
look beyond one-dimensional notions of quantity in measuring speech effects is overcome,
spending limits can be seen to advance First Amendment values in some ways, even while
threatening them in other ways." Id.
274. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976). But a contribution is limited speech which
"does not communicate the underlying basis for the support," so "a limitation upon the amount
that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id. at 20-
21.
275. Id. at 22.
276. MAKINSON, supra note 8, at 38 (quoting Sen. Slade Gorton (R-WA)).
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the fact that financial support is only one of a number of ways to
support a candidate. Significantly, "given the unequal distribution of
wealth, money does not measure intensity of desire equally for rich and
poor.... a large contribution by a person of great means may influence
an election enormously, and yet may represent a far lesser intensity of
desire than a pittance given by a poor person.' 277 In other words, the
$2,000 maximum contribution from George Soros or Bill Gates
probably does not indicate the level of emotional support as would a $5
or $10 donation from a person with fixed income who may be more
likely to work phone banks, or canvass door-to-door.
Likewise, while money does reflect a commitment of resources and
may purchase forms of speech, it is not pure speech. In Justice Stevens'
words,
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of
tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football
field. Money, meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to
perform the same tasks. It does not follow, however, that the First
Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the use of
money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of ideas to
achieve the same results.
278
Campaign expenditure limits both respect the speech and
associational values of contributions and fundraising, but also maintain
the perspective on the importance of other modes of expression and the
pitfalls of the current money chase.
Although there are many negative ramifications of the current
fundraising system, fundraising is not inherently evil. 279 But we have
passed the saturation level, 28° and as spending increases faster than
277. Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring in denial
of rehearing).
278. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
279. Scholars like Rick Hasen, Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz persuasively argue that the
current system creates and perpetuates inequalities. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The
Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1164 (1994) ("Specifically, equal protection requires an inquiry into
whether all citizens enjoy sufficient equality in the political field to participate meaningfully in
public elections as voters, speakers, and candidates whenever they so desire."); Raskin &
Bonifaz, supra note 259, at 279-80 ('The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that the
current campaign finance regime is inconsistent with equal protection or, at the very least,
warrants congressional action to vindicate equal protection."). See also Alexander, supra note
200 (arguing that equality of participation in campaigns improves the quality of the representative
democracy).
280. For example, in the 2004 Senate campaign in South Dakota, where the two major parties
combined spent more money than in any other election, see supra note 26, spending had a terrible
effect. As was reported in the week before the election, "[s]pending on the races has been
enormous.... In South Dakota alone, outside groups have spent $9 million in support of Mr.
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inflation, there is no telling where it will stop. As fundraising occurs
today, it skews the process, because candidates spend so much of their
time chasing money from a limited pool of wealthy (and politically
interested) individuals, many outside their district. 81  At a certain
point-a point that has long ago passed-it takes too much time from
other valuable, constitutionally-protected activities. And as long as
spending goes up, it will get worse. Spending caps are directly
responsive to this time protection problem, and they are more
responsive than either eliminating contribution caps or providing public
funds (without spending caps).
There is no absolute formula to apply to design the perfectly tailored
campaign expenditure limits, and determining the appropriate specific
remedy will best be left to local determination. But to the extent that
states are laboratories of democracy, 2 83 experimentation of this sort
284should be allowed, even encouraged. In matters as important as the
Thune, whose campaign is so flush he is having trouble spending it all. 'You reach a saturation
point,' said Dick Wadhams, Mr. Thune's campaign manager." Carl Hulse & Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Races for House and Senate Have Been Nasty, Expensive and Focused on Local Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at A31.
281. See supra Part lI.B (describing why candidates are spending increasingly more time
raising campaign funds).
282. Of course, there is no single silver bullet to be found. As the Court and scholars have
warned, "[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how
Congress will respond, are concerns for another day." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224
(2003). See also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (arguing that political money is like water in that it
always has a place to go and is part of a broader "ecosystem"). Further, Colorado Republicans
made clear that reviewing courts can carefully examine the relationship between party money and
individual candidates, and McConnell furthered that notion by lashing out against attempts to
circumvent the letter and spirit of campaign finance laws. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137
(approvingly citing lower level of scrutiny for contributions, so as to "provide[] Congress with
sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations
designed to protect the integrity of the political process"); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 434 (2001) ("Parties thus perform functions more complex than
simply electing their candidates: they act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to
produce obligated officeholders."). Further injections of reality into jurisprudence can help stem
the tide of evasive funding schemes.
283. "Courts and commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as
laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas. This state
innovation is no judicial myth." Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
788 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs.").
284. See Roland S. Homet, Jr., Fact Finding in First Amendment Litigation: The Case of
Campaign Reform, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 97, 107-09 (1996) (noting some of the problems
we face today can be seen as an unintended consequence of the court deciding Buckley without
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functioning of our system of government, random experiments should
not be taken on lightly. This is a course of action that has been proven
to work: in both Vermont and Albuquerque, spending limits served to
protect the time of candidates and officeholders. 285 As governments
pursue this course, they should be guided by the lessons from those
jurisdictions. Further, while this article develops a foundation for the
time protection rationale, it is not purely an exercise in theory. The
specific issue of time protection and campaign expenditures is currently
in the Justices' hands. 86 There is significant confusion as to the matter
in the lower federal courts, with a clear circuit split. 287  The Court
should recognize the constitutionally compelling nature of the time
protection rationale. From there, lower courts can review specific plans,
asking whether the reform in question is appropriately tailored to
achieve the goal sought. Capping expenditures is essential to achieving
this compelling government interest, and the time is right to explore the
possibilities.
V. CONCLUSION
As candidates and officeholders spend more time in pursuit of
campaign cash, they spend less time in communication with the people
and in service of the public good. Protecting this time is more than just
an important policy matter, it is a compelling government interest. The
Buckley Court left the door open for the development of a new rationale
that might satisfy strict scrutiny; in recent years there has been increased
attention to this prospect on the Court; and now, there is a circuit split
over the issue. Under the prevailing analysis, a compelling government
interest is required to justify any campaign finance regulation. This
Article has shown that the time protection rationale is a compelling
government interest that safeguards the integrity of the political-
governmental system. It serves to defend the integrity of campaigns, to
the full factual record).
285. See supra Part II.D (explaining why a compelling government interest exists in time
protection). Recall that the Federal District Court in both Homans and Landell upheld the factual
premise involved here; in Homans, the Tenth Circuit reversed based on its belief that Buckley
would not allow any campaign spending caps as a matter of law. See Landell H, 382 F.3d 91, 121
(2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005) (holding that time protection is a compelling
government interest); Homans H, 366 F.3d 900, 915 (10th Cir. 2004) (agreeing with the facts
found by the trial court, but refusing to overturn Buckley).
286. Landell I1, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
287. The Circuit split is clear between the Second and Tenth Circuits, which have explicitly
considered and ruled on opposite sides of this question. Also the First and Eighth Circuits have
weighed in favorably on the side of the Second Circuit position and the Sixth Circuit seems pre-
disposed to the Tenth Circuit's side of the matter. See supra Part II.C (outlining the split
amongst the circuits regarding the time protection rationale).
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ensure that the people's business gets done, and to preserve the values
of the American Republic. With that established, campaign expenditure
limits are the most narrowly tailored means to protect the time of
candidates and officeholders. They reduce the amount of money to be
spent, and accordingly reduce the amount of time required to raise that
money. Spending limits are more directly responsive than public
financing, and they do not carry the significant corruption baggage of
complete deregulation. In sum, campaign spending limits are a
constitutionally sound approach to directly serve the compelling
government interest in protecting the time of candidates and elected
officials.
